University of Central Florida

STARS
HIM 1990-2015
2012

Legitimizing the "republican monarch" a reexamination of French
foreign policy in the Atlantic Alliance, 1958-1960
Drew Fedorka
University of Central Florida

Part of the History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM
1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Fedorka, Drew, "Legitimizing the "republican monarch" a reexamination of French foreign policy in the
Atlantic Alliance, 1958-1960" (2012). HIM 1990-2015. 1263.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1263

LEGITIMIZING THE “REPUBLICAN MONARCH”: A
REEXAMINATION OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 1958-1960

by

DREW M. FEDORKA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major Program in History
in the College of Arts and Humanities
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term 2012

Thesis Chair: Dr. Amelia H. Lyons

© 2012 Drew M. Fedorka

ii

ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the role foreign policy played in legitimizing the early French Fifth
Republic from 1958 to 1960. I argue that President Charles de Gaulle employed foreign policy in
the service of gaining public support for his new government and the new republic. Many
historians have argued previously that his foreign policy of grandeur, as it came to be called, was
used to recast international politics and France‟s role in them. My work diverges from these
previous interpretations by arguing that Gaullist foreign policy served, in many instances,
overarching domestic goals, not French international interests. I see foreign policy as inseparable
from the broader domestic ambition to craft a persuasive narrative of renewal and national unity
under Gaullist stewardship. In the process, my study puts de Gaulle‟s foreign policy into the
context of his larger aspiration to precipitate constitutional reform and, thereafter, ensure popular
support. De Gaulle exploited opportunities to use foreign policy in order to shape public opinion,
both domestically and internationally. These efforts, as my research reflects, helped foster public
support for the new regime and, by portraying national renewal, further discredited the preceding
Fourth Republic.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 1958, the leading politicians of the French nation, burdened by years of colonial
conflict and a public clamoring for resolution, turned to the wartime hero, Charles de Gaulle,
with hopes of securing a solution palatable to the many seemingly irreconcilable factions of
French society. Upon his official return, de Gaulle, joined by his loyalist of companions, set out
to end the short-lived Fourth Republic. Broad swathes of a weary public proved ready to forsake
the postwar republic in exchange for de Gaulle‟s ambiguous promise to settle the ongoing
Algerian War. By late summer 1958 a small group, headed by de Gaulle‟s closest advisor
Michel Debré, completed the draft of a new constitution. On 28 September 1958, 80% of the
public, vested in de Gaulle, approved of the constitution that became the foundation of the Fifth
French Republic. Nearly three months later, on 21 December 1958, the electoral notables chose
Charles de Gaulle as the first president of the Fifth Republic. On 8 January 1959, de Gaulle
began his presidency.1 That day marked the beginning of, among many other things, an
extravagant foreign policy which, for the next 10 years, often captivated France‟s domestic
audience as much as it frustrated France‟s allies. De Gaulle‟s foreign policy of grandeur has
since perplexed and fascinated the many historians who have analyzed its intentions and goals.
Since de Gaulle‟s presidency, countless historians and political scientists have penned
works devoted to his diplomatic initiatives. Early works, like W.W. Kulski‟s De Gaulle and the
World offered careful analyses of de Gaulle‟s initiatives but indubitably found themselves
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Philip Thody, The French Fifth Republic: Presidents, Politics, and Personalities (London: Routledge,
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wrapped up in the politics of the day.2 Others quickly followed. The common theme among
them tended to rest on the idea that French foreign policy was “overtly striven to preserve and
extend French influence abroad.”3 Herbert Tint‟s French Foreign Policy since the Second World
War and John Newhouse‟s De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons provide prime examples of this
trend.4 Shortly thereafter, Stanley Hoffman offered the first seminal text on de Gaulle‟s foreign
policy, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s. Hoffman‟s work considered de Gaulle‟s
diplomacy alongside, though separate from, his domestic role in French society.5 The work
provided a valuable framework through which to see how de Gaulle‟s conceptions of grandeur
and his political cunning played out in both the domestic context and the international arena.
Other works from the period offered significant contributions to the field. Wilfrid Kohl‟s
French Nuclear Diplomacy, for instance, placed the French pursuit of an independent nuclear
force in the center of a larger, overarching diplomatic strategy which the nuclear program was
not simply one part of, but central to.6 His work helped establish the importance of the nuclear
force to France‟s political and diplomatic strategy. Another work from the period, Michael M.
Harrison‟s The Reluctant Ally, argued that “French security and alliance policies … ceas[ed] to
be such divisive issues in domestic politics largely because of the gradual emergence of a
national consensus on the value of the Gaullist security model.”7 Harrison‟s monograph offered
an insightful analysis on the policy continuities between the Fourth and Fifth Republics, while
2
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also identifying why Gaullist conceptions of independence – whether in nuclear capability or
alliances – has since become the basis for French foreign policy.
The early 1990s saw the emergence of a number of works that focused specifically on the
relationship between the United States and France, as well as the tensions that arose as both
countries tried to advance their own interests. Frank Costigliola‟s France and the United States,
Charles G. Cogan‟s Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends, and the edited collection De Gaulle and the
United States all represent this trend.8 The late 1990s saw the emergence of several major works
by two French historians, both aided by extensive (and presumably previously unavailable)
archival research. Maurice Vaïsse‟s La Grandeur placed, and rightly so, the Algerian War and
decolonization elsewhere in Africa squarely within the broader context of Gaullist foreign
policy, something the vast majority of diplomatic histories had previously neglected. 9 The other,
Frédéric Bozo‟s Two Strategies for Europe added to the conclusions advanced by Stanley
Hoffman that saw de Gaulle‟s foreign policy as an all-encompassing “grand design” in which
“power, independence, and grandeur were for de Gaulle inseparable from the much wider
objective of transforming the international system.”10
Through the course of the historiography, many historians have offered nuanced
contributions that have, each in their own way, advanced our understanding of the complexities
and considerations that surrounded French diplomacy in the age of de Gaulle. Still, I will argue,
8
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there exist more continuities than differences. Surely, the historiography has since shed subtle
accusations of anti-Americanism found in earlier works such as Newhouse‟s De Gaulle and the
Anglo-Saxons. Yet, the interpretation presented by Stanley Hoffman in 1974 has since become
the underlying foundation for all contributions that followed. As Hoffman noted, “…the purpose
of [de Gaulle‟s] statecraft was never in doubt. He had an unalterable set of imperatives and a
clear design. The imperative was to renew France‟s substance and power, to restore her influence
abroad, and to have her play as independent and active a role on the world stage as the world and
French resources allowed.”11 Indeed, this assertion, that de Gaulle designed French policy with
the intent of restoring France‟s international standing, has reigned supreme.
To illustrate this, we turn briefly to a contemporary rumination on the question at hand.
In the conclusion to the 2010 edited collection, Globalizing de Gaulle, Garret Martin assessed
the state of the debate. In it, he asked “What was [de Gaulle] trying to achieve with his often
maverick foreign policy? Did he have a grand design, that is to say an overarching and ambitious
vision to reshape international affairs, or was it mere posturing to further, and only further,
France‟s prestige? This question divided commentators at the time, and still does today.”12
This thesis seeks to diverge from the prevailing narrative that has hitherto dominated the
interpretations of Gaullist foreign policy. In doing so, it rejects the notion that Gaullist foreign
policy, at least in the early years of the Fifth Republic, sought to secure the return of France‟s
“great power” standing or the restoration and spread of French international influence. Instead, it
11
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argues that much of de Gaulle‟s major foreign policy decisions in the earliest years of his
premiership, 1958-1960, were designed and executed with the intent of satisfying domestic
goals. It argues that foreign policy served less to advance French interests on the international
stage and more to act as an adjunct to Gaullist efforts to shape public opinion and garner popular
support for the young Fifth Republic. Foreign policy, I argue, played a principal role in shaping
the narrative of national unity central to the Gaullist republic.
In these efforts, this thesis has several main goals. First, it seeks to place Gaullist
domestic ambitions squarely within the context of an analysis of foreign policy. The diplomatic
literature on de Gaulle has neglected the central (and overriding) importance with which he and
his closest allies, including Michel Debré and André Malraux, regarded constitutional reform.
The founding of the Fifth Republic, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, proved central to all other
considerations in the early years of de Gaulle‟s tenure. Secondly, this thesis aims to blur the line
where domestic policy ends and foreign policy begins. It posits that foreign policy does not occur
in a vacuum, unaffected by domestic constraints, concerns, or goals. Instead, it can, and does,
play a crucial role in the shaping of domestic politics. Lastly, the broader goal of this thesis is to
force a reconsideration of the role of foreign policy in general and to encourage considerations
into possible domestic motivations of diplomacy during future research.
In reaching this alternative interpretation of Gaullist foreign policy, I must credit the
works, outside the gamut of diplomatic literature, which influenced my understanding of the
anxieties and priorities of the period. Two in particular, Richard Kuisel‟s Seducing the French:
The Dilemma of Americanization and Kristin Ross‟s Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization
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and the Reordering of French Culture helped contextualize the fundamental changes French
society underwent in the period and how the Cold War and “Americanization,” as well as
domestic transformations, shaped France.13 Additionally, other works, like Herman Lebovics‟s
Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture, helped impress
upon me the Gaullists‟ broader goals for the Fifth Republic and national unity.14 Inclusion of
prominent cultural, social, and political historians, has allowed me to develop a more
complicated and nuanced view of Gaullist ambitions and French society in the period concerned.
Before proceeding further, however, I find it prudent to define the limits of this study. For
one, the study is limited to the years between 1958 and 1960 for several reasons. The first reason
is the narrowed scope of an undergraduate honors thesis imposes certain constraints. Secondly,
this period witnessed the creation of the Fifth Republic and early Gaullist efforts to ensure its
legitimacy. Also, the study confines itself to an analysis of Gaullist foreign policy within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Atlantic Alliance. More specifically, the study
focuses solely on France‟s interaction with the United States and United Kingdom within the
alliance. In doing so, other NATO members – the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the
Benelux countries, for instance – are neglected. Additionally, the reader will notice the Algerian
War and the French pursuit of an independent nuclear force – both undoubtedly central to French
history of the period – are (regrettably) treated as tangential factors to the story. The politics of
European integration are avoided completely. The reasoning is twofold. Again, the capacities of
13
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an undergraduate thesis prevent a larger role for the above topics. But also, and more
importantly, it is the interactions with the Anglo-Americans in the context of NATO which best
illustrate my argument.
This delineation brings me to another limitation of the study that the reader will
undoubtedly consider, if not outright challenge. In arguing that the reader must reconsider the
intent of Gaullist foreign policy, I do not imply all foreign policy decisions. Naturally, most of
the foreign policy formulations during the de Gaulle presidency strictly served France‟s interests
in the international arena and did not seek to shape (at least overtly) French domestic opinion.
Negotiations over European integration, for instance, or de Gaulle‟s efforts to court nations in
South America and Africa served France‟s economic and strategic interests.
There were two distinct types of diplomacy employed. There was the day-to-day efforts
of diplomats like Ambassador Hervé Alphand and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville,
as well as other members of de Gaulle‟s cabinet who, at the President‟s request, went on foreign
excursions meant to advance France‟s interests abroad. These functions are quite typical of all
nations, in all time periods, within the diplomatic sphere. Then there was the other side of French
diplomacy: the decisions and actions taken by de Gaulle himself. These moves, undertaken with
an outward appearance of unilateralism, tended towards abruptness and generally privileged
theatrical flair over negotiation or compromise. He announced decisions with an air of
spontaneity – undoubtedly with the intent of attracting media attention – not after long, tiresome
negotiations. Unilateral foreign policy decisions provided, as Stanley Hoffman suggested, “the
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confrontations and the solo performances de Gaulle seemed to crave” in his efforts to project a
presidential authority.15 It is these latter aspects of French diplomacy that concern us here.
As this thesis will demonstrate, a large portion of French diplomatic decisions did prove
superficial, especially in the context of the NATO alliance. In this respect, this thesis challenges
the prevailing narrative that de Gaulle‟s orchestrations within the alliance served only to
strengthen France‟s international standing and influence within (and eventually in contrast to)
NATO. Contrary to the narrative which has interpreted the selected foreign policy decisions as
part of a “grand design” to hasten an end to the bi-polar Cold War while enhancing French
influence in the process, this study will demonstrate that the major policy decisions in relation to
NATO in 1958-1959 – the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO
integration and the removal of NATO nuclear stock piles from French soil – had no real intention
of strengthening France‟s bid for international influence or leadership, but instead augmented the
Gaullist domestic narrative of renewal under the Fifth Republic. Equally, this thesis seeks to
place renewed importance on the aforementioned decisions, as well as de Gaulle‟s state visits of
1960, which the diplomatic historiography has commonly seen as mere stepping stones,
restricted by the larger demands of the ongoing Algerian War, towards the full-on foreign policy
of grandeur which blossomed following the war‟s end in 1962.
The thesis is therefore organized as follows. Chapter One is used to establish the
domestic priorities facing the Gaullists in 1958 and thereafter. It analyzes the politics that
surrounded the founding of the Fifth Republic and the efforts to establish the preeminence of

15
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constitutional reform. This chapter challenges, if subtly, the assertions found in the diplomatic
histories on the topic which suggest that de Gaulle‟s foremost concern upon his return to power
was reviving French influence and prestige in the world. As Michel Debré, de Gaulle‟s closest
advisor and first Prime Minister, reminded us, “despite pressing economic and financial
problems, despite the difficulty of the Algerian problem, General de Gaulle made it his first
priority to draft a new constitution.”16 Indeed, everything else – the Algerian War, France‟s
global standing, the French economy and society – depended on this “all-important” task.17 This
rationale came from the belief that, in order to execute all other endeavors successfully, France
needed a governmental framework that ensured a stable and effective state.
The chapter begins by examining de Gaulle‟s postwar foray into politics, joined by likeminded compatriots, in an effort to illustrate the extent to which de Gaulle and his allies strove to
shape the French political and governmental system. The final section of the chapter will address
the period surrounding the formation of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle‟s return from political
exile. This section will serve to demonstrate how various Gaullists took advantage of the
increasing crisis in Algeria to precipitate an end to the Fourth Republic and, in doing so, usher in
the Fifth Republic. Additionally, during this period of constitutional reform, we see a significant
effort by de Gaulle and others to discredit the Fourth Republic and emphasize the
indispensability of the new Fifth Republic institutions to the well-being of France. Their efforts,
as we shall see, culminated in the construction of a narrative which asserted that France had
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undergone a genuine – and necessary – transformation which promised national unity and
renewal under the auspices of de Gaulle.
Chapter Two considers France‟s position in the Cold War and how the Gaullists
exploited this position to ensure the greatest domestic response. As Chapter One explained,
constitutional reform proved the central factor to Gaullist efforts of the late 1950s. In this regard,
the second chapter picks ups where the first leaves off. The second chapter seeks to demonstrate
how the architects of the Fifth Republic sought to legitimize their new republic and its
institutional changes – a strong, independent president juxtaposed against a parliament weaker
than the French Republic had ever known – through foreign policy. The Gaullists believed that if
they could craft a compelling message of renewal and rejuvenation, evidenced by tangible acts
and policies, they could garner widespread and genuine support for the new regime, thus
vindicating the constitutional reforms of 1958. This process relied on efforts to portray a marked
change from the vilified Fourth Republic (which in Gaullist mythology reinforced a divisive and
polarized French society) to the Fifth Republic which served to unite the country around the
monarchical and paternal figure of Charles de Gaulle.
This is where foreign policy becomes relevant to their efforts. How better to portray a
major transformation in French politics than by acting out a highly visible, if not highly
effectual, foreign policy buttressed by the inviting message of grandeur? This chapter serves also
to challenge the prevailing narrative that de Gaulle‟s actions against the de facto AngloAmerican leadership during the period – the 1958 September Memorandum on the Directory and
the 1959 decisions on the French Mediterranean Fleet and NATO nuclear stockpiles –
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demonstrate his bid to increase France‟s leadership in the Western bloc of the Cold War. Instead,
as the chapter will reflect, de Gaulle‟s policies against NATO in the early years of his presidency
were a response to ambivalence felt throughout the French public about France‟s position in the
Cold War bloc system. The chapter helps to place into context French attitudes about the Cold
War and to remind us that de Gaulle‟s actions corresponded less to the confining Cold War
paradigm and more to domestic socio-economic anxieties.
Chapter Three provides examinations of the relevant policy decisions carried out during
1959-1960, the first two years of de Gaulle‟s presidency. The chapter hinges on the
understanding, which is reflected in the evidence, that the decisions did little, if anything, to alter
France‟s international standing or French or NATO strategic considerations. Instead, the
decisions served primarily to advance the Gaullist domestic narrative of both renewal and of a
French state responding to the concerns of the French people. As the evidence will suggest, the
Gaullist politics of independence in 1959 – the decisions to withdraw the French Mediterranean
Fleet and to remove foreign nuclear stockpiles – proved strategically ineffectual at best. Yet both
actions carried numerous domestic benefits. For one, they were both highly visible and tangible
acts, which portrayed a sharp contrast to the muted diplomatic style exercised by leaders of the
Fourth Republic. Secondly, both actions had broad support across the French political spectrum,
which helped reinforce the claims of de Gaulle as embodiment of national unity.
The second half of the chapter examines the role of de Gaulle‟s official state visits to the
United Kingdom and the United States in April 1960. Both events – marginalized (and, more
often, not mentioned at all) by previous literature – helped support Gaullist claims of a national
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renaissance under de Gaulle‟s leadership. Using all the symbolism he could muster, de Gaulle
evoked immense enthusiasm in both countries which, in turn, transfixed French newspapers for
the duration of his official trip. The overwhelming passion and exuberance shown to de Gaulle
by the UK and US crowds suggests, as the chapter reflects, that the events helped influence the
French public‟s own perception of their president.
Through these various diplomatic efforts, de Gaulle and company hoped to construct a
persuasive narrative about the ostensible benefits of the Gaullist constitutional reforms
implemented in 1958. De Gaulle capitalized on popular socio-economic and cultural anxieties
from the period, namely the omnipresent Cold War and the fears of “Americanization,” to carry
out a foreign policy with broad popular appeal. But before he could serve as the stately
personification of the Fifth Republic – the indefatigable “Republican Monarch,” in Debré‟s
words – de Gaulle and his allies had to realize their long-sought constitutional reforms.
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CHAPTER 1: GAULLISM AND THE PURSUIT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
In 1959, the first full year of the Fifth French Republic, Gaullist intellectual Raymond
Aron reflected on the events which had recently unfolded:
The crisis which General de Gaulle had always predicted but which he had
waited for so long in vain was brought on by the Algerian War … and [with
it] the General had again become a national hero, „the most illustrious of
Frenchmen.‟ In 1958 he gave France a constitution as he had passionately
wanted to do for nearly twenty years, and as he very likely would have been
able to twelve years sooner had he shown the tactical skill, moderation, and
charm of which he had given so many proofs during recent months.1
The creation of the Fifth Republic constitution, as Aron noted, was not simply a byproduct of the
unfolding events of 1958. Instead, its birth culminated from years of trying, in vain, on the part
of Charles de Gaulle and his many companions to affect a lasting change to the French political
system. The Gaullists deemed reform necessary and, in 1958, inevitable to ensure governmental
strength in times of crisis and a structure that promoted national unity and mitigated disparate
social tensions.
The goal of this chapter, then, is to establish the preeminence of constitutional reform to
the overall Gaullist agenda. In doing so, it challenges the prevailing narrative that has long
dictated the historiography of Gaullist foreign policy, one that assumes that de Gaulle‟s
diplomatic ventures were confined to international goals – from enhancing France‟s global
standing to precipitating détente within the Cold War. The diplomatic histories on the subject

1
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have, thus far, generally neglected not only the domestic developments and concerns that
influenced Gaullist policy but also the importance with which he regarded constitutional reform.
The reader will quickly note the heavy reliance on secondary literature in this chapter. Indeed, it
hardly reveals anything new regarding the political developments surrounding the founding of
the Fifth Republic. What is new, however, is its placement within the context of a larger work on
Gaullist foreign policy.
This chapter hopes to establish the value that the Gaullists placed on constitutional
reform; something that long predated concerns about France‟s international standing in the Fifth
Republic. Once we understand the central role this domestic priority played to their overall
agenda, we can then, in the preceding chapters, examine how foreign policy augmented domestic
concerns.
THE FOURTH REPUBLIC: GAULLISM‟S POLITICAL ACTIVISM
Once the war in Europe ended in mid-1945, the reestablished states of Western and
Central Europe held parliamentary elections which brought the eventual return of political
parties. Lurid memories of fascism propelled many states to opt for parliamentary-led coalition
governments.2 In France, with elections in 1945, the result was no different. The major winners,
the Socialist Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the Communist Party (PCF),
and the newly-formed Christian-Democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) each
garnered approximately one quarter of the vote of the Constituent Assembly responsible for state
restoration. The three-way coalition opted to preserve de Gaulle, prominent thanks to his

2

Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 286-87.
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wartime leadership of the Free French, as head of the postwar provisional government and
moved to draft a new constitution. The political wrangling which accompanied the debates over
state budgetary matters and constitutional reform soon became too much for the Free French
leader. De Gaulle, feeling the limits of his influence and disillusioned by the return of the aspects
he reviled in the Third Republic, opted to resign on 20 January 1946.3 On his heels followed the
loyal Gaullist ministers, many of whom had forged a relationship with de Gaulle during the war
and were unaffiliated with the three parties of the coalition.4
In resigning, de Gaulle greatly overestimated his own importance and influence. The
quarreling of the political parties, as he saw it, would inevitably lead to their collapse and, with
it, a chorus of cries for his return. He was wrong. The postwar coalition of the SFIO, PCF, and
MRP proved perfectly capable of continuing without him. Soon, the leftist contingent of the
three-way political coalition produced a constitution which they put to national referendum. Not
surprisingly, the Gaullists vehemently rejected the constitution, but they were not alone. The
majority of the French public, including the center-right MRP, also rejected it. With the
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constitution‟s failure, de Gaulle saw an opportunity to reenter the fray with hopes of influencing
the outcome of the revised constitution.5
His efforts culminated in the speech at Bayeux, France on 16 June 1946. This effort
became the official Gaullist prescription for constitutional reform. In typical Gaullist fashion, the
speech was replete with symbolism. Outfitted in his military uniform adorned with the Free
French insignia, surrounded by fellow veterans, and located at the site associated with the allied
landings of 1944, de Gaulle launched into his speech. The philosophy of liberal monarchist
Montesquieu and the ruminations of loyal compatriot Michel Debré provided the intellectual
inspiration for the speech.6 In it, de Gaulle denounced his usual targets. He chastised the Third
Republic and the “rivalry of the parties” which, he argued, too often disregarded “the higher
interests of the country.”7 Eventually, he offered his prescription for the governmental ills of
France: the country required a strong Head of State, separate from the parliament and “situated
above the parties,” who could “reconcile the general interest” of the French public.8 He, like
Debré and others, envisioned a strong leader, answerable to the people alone, as the only way to
precipitate national unity.
These proclamations proved incredibly audacious following years of dictatorial rule
during the war. The speech and, more importantly, de Gaulle‟s haughty delivery reflected a
profound misunderstanding of fundamental postwar changes to governance. Indeed, the
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prevalence of parliamentary coalitions throughout Western Europe, not just France, was a
conscious response to the memories of a discredited authoritarianism.9 Given his conspicuous
denouncements of the Third Republic and parliamentary democracy, the left proved quick to
ascribe fascist and Bonapartist labels to the General and the Gaullist doctrines. Ultimately, the
politicians in Paris, conscious of France‟s recent past and intent on preventing any one political
force – especially Communist or Gaullist – from gaining too much influence, rejected his advice.
Shortly afterward, the French public approved, if narrowly, the constitution of the Fourth
Republic, the structure of which closely mirrored the Third Republic, thereby leaving ultimate
power in the hands of the assembly.10 Frustrated with the outcome, de Gaulle departed to rethink
his political strategy to affect change.
Within months of the speech at Bayeux, key Gaullist groups began sowing seeds for a
broad political movement against the reviled Fourth Republic. As early as October 1946, a secret
group of Gaullists led by André Malraux and joined by Jacques Soustelle, Pierre Lefranc, and
Jacques Foccart among others, began plotting a movement which would allow for de Gaulle‟s
political return. De Gaulle himself also began courting reliable allies, drawn mostly from his
collection of wartime compatriots. By early 1947, the foundation of the group was intact. The
movement took the name Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French People), or
RPF for short and included in its ranks the most notable of Gaullists: Malraux, Soustelle,
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Foccart, Debré, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas.11 The movement sought to “group the French
people” in a way that allowed them to develop policies “independent of any single political party
aspirations.”12 This goal, on the surface, sounded benign enough. The RPF, however, intended to
garner enough votes to become the majority party and, once there, precipitate the downfall of the
Fourth Republic.
The hardening of the Cold War in the summer of 1947 provided the backdrop for the rise
of the RPF. With the tightening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the establishment of the
Cominform, accompanied by American offers for monetary aid, the major governing parties in
France quickly ostracized the French Communist Party and moved to block it from gaining any
positions of influence. With the perceived rise of an external Communist threat, the RPF, too,
turned its focus on the PCF. Whereas a narrative of constitutional change marked the RPF‟s first
months of existence, by mid-summer 1947 the RPF‟s platform focused narrowly on anticommunism. This singular focus, a more compelling message than institutional reform, allowed
the RPF to attract a wide array of voters, robbing the major parties of many of their
constituencies.13 In its first elections, in 1947, the RPF won 38% of the French vote. Within a
year, the RPF had over one million members. The movement effectively launched a successful
monthly journal, Liberté de l’espirit, edited by Claude Mauriac and enhanced by contributors
such as Raymond Aron. By 1951, the RPF was the largest party in French politics.14
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These successes, however, belied the limits of the RPF. The mainstream parties soon
viewed the RPF, like the French Communist Party, as a danger to the republic. They quickly
moved to stigmatize the RPF, making efforts to prevent their members from participating in the
movement. This is, perhaps, not surprising. The RPF‟s entire reason for being was to gain
enough support to extinguish the Fourth Republic and, with it, the political parties. Additionally,
the RPF operated with a militancy rivaled only by the French communists. As the PCF, in their
fall from a central government role, became increasingly reactionary, the RPF too took on an
aggressive and, at times, violent role in French politics. Opponents quickly labeled the RPF as a
radical far-right, even fascist, entity. Ominously to many, the RPF and the PCF, both of which
envisioned the downfall of the existing political order, were the two largest parties in French
politics by the late 1940s.15
The mainstream parties, namely the MRP, the SFIO, and the smaller Radicals and
Moderates, responded to this dual-sided threat with a system of political alliances, called the
Third Force, which prevented either fringe party from gaining electoral prominence. The
reluctance of the RPF and PCF to compromise with the other parties furthered their isolation. By
1951 a loss of 350,000 members accompanied waning electoral success for the RPF.16 The final
death knell came when a leading member of the movement, Jacques Soustelle, responded to calls
from President Vincent Auriol to play a larger role in the National Assembly. Disillusioned by
the RPF‟s active participation in the “games, poisons, and delights of the system” it was meant to
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end, de Gaulle abandoned the movement in May 1953 and turned to what Malraux deemed the
“political wilderness.”17
From his political departure in 1953 until his grand return in May, 1958, de Gaulle abided
in a quiet retirement at Colombey-les-deux-Églises. After his failed efforts at Bayeaux and
through the RPF, de Gaulle became jaded regarding the Fourth Republic. As he told C.L
Sulzberger in 1955, “Regimes never reform themselves. They simply fall. They collapse.”
Indeed, he added, no meaningful constitutional change could occur under the Fourth Republic,
“this regime must first vanish – as the regime vanished in 1940.”18 Other prominent Gaullists,
meanwhile, such as Soustelle and Debré remained active within the Fourth Republic, often as
outspoken critics of the republic and its positions on decolonization, the Cold War, and European
integration, among other issues. The parliamentary Gaullists that outlasted the RPF as well as de
Gaulle himself eventually coalesced in the spring of 1958 with the Algerian War as backdrop to
institute the long-sought end of the Fourth Republic.
THE ALGERIAN WAR AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
After engaging in the political arena through several endeavors – mainly the speech at
Bayeux and the RPF – during the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle had not only learned the limits of
his influence but also tarnished his public image in the process. Indeed, upon emerging from the
war, de Gaulle embodied, to many, national unity. His image appeared above the political fray,
his name inseparable from the credibility of the Free French and the Resistance. Yet, after his
involvement in the RPF, de Gaulle seemed to many, at best, a contributor to the partisanship and
17
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political fighting he claimed to oppose and, at worst (as the left would liken him), a threat to the
Republic and democracy itself. Other Gaullist leaders too, like Soustelle and Debré in particular,
often represented reactionary and oppositional forces within the Fourth Republic, which did little
to further their image.
By the spring of 1958, the Gaullists had learned their lesson. When the events which
precipitating de Gaulle‟s political return arose, he waited until the opportunity was ripe for him
to implement the long sought-after constitutional revisions.19 Only after he was guaranteed full
powers to rewrite the constitution did he return. The others too, Debré, Malraux, and Soustelle
among them, moved behind the scenes in different arenas to clear the way for de Gaulle‟s return.
Two narratives emerged in 1958, largely crafted by the Gaullists themselves, which
emphasized the necessity and therefore inevitability of de Gaulle‟s ascension to power and
subsequent constitutional reform. The first, in May and June 1958, posited that only de Gaulle,
the human embodiment of national unity, could bring a palatable resolution to the ongoing
quagmire in Algeria while, in the process, staving off the ubiquitous threats of civil war. The
second narrative to emerge, in the autumn of 1958, stressed the dire need for the French public to
approve the Fifth Republic constitution, thereby ending the short-lived Fourth Republic. All the
while, the apparent dangers of the Algerian War provided the backdrop for the unfolding events.
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The war in Algeria had, by 1958, raged for four grueling years as the French fought to
suppress the Algerian nationalists‟ bid for independence. Algeria was first established as a
French colony in 1830 and, by 1954, had become a part of metropolitan France, divided into
three departments and answerable to the French Ministry of the Interior. Algeria‟s strong ties to
France made the conflict‟s potential to divide enormous. Support for Algérie Française ranged
from Gaullists to Socialists.20 The left, meanwhile, bitterly opposed what they deemed as
France‟s nationalist and imperialistic agenda.21 Complicating matters further was the fate of
nearly one million French settlers who lived in the North African colony and whose fate hinged
on the preservation of Algérie Française. The dire stakes made the settler population a boisterous
and demanding political force, intent on preventing any concessions to the Algerian nationalist
forces. Their actions, greatly supported by the French military, directed the government towards
an increasingly hard line against the Algerian opposition.22 The left proved militant in their antiimperial stance, rivaled only by the settler population‟s conviction for colonial preservation.
The tensions between factions, which had steadily risen since the beginning of the war,
came to a fore on 13 May 1958 when a large mob of settlers in Algiers rioted over the investiture
of the Christian-Democrat Pierre Pflimlin, a moderate politician openly in favor of negotiation
with the Algerian nationalists. Alongside the protestors, two leading military figures based in
Algiers, Generals Jacques Massu and Raoul Salan, formed a Committee of Public Safety intent
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on forcing governmental change in Paris. The common denominator between the two groups –
the rioting settlers and the conspiring generals – was General de Gaulle. Both parties believed de
Gaulle was the only figure with the capacity to preserve French Algeria in a time of waning
support in Paris.23
But why the General? What distinguished him, at this moment of uncertainty, as the
staunch and steadfast ally of French Algeria? Certainly, it was not de Gaulle himself. He never,
during his time in the political spotlight, presented a clear position on French Algeria and he
withdrew from politics a year before the Algerian War began. He did not offer comments on the
subject in his infrequent public remarks made between 1953 and 1958 thereafter. If de Gaulle
remained silent, however, fellow Gaullist Jacques Soustelle did not. Soustelle served as
Governor-General in Algeria in 1955-56. He became one of the most outspoken adherents to
French Algeria and, in doing so, won over many of the conservative Algerian settlers to the
Gaullist cause. The military too found themselves often aligned with Soustelle‟s conservatism.
These elements converged to help encourage the return of de Gaulle as developments ostensibly
worsened for the settlers in spring 1958.24
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Eventually, after more than a week of plotting, the conspiring generals in Algiers acted.
On the evening of 24 May, Massu and Salan, utilizing paratroopers, carried out “Operation
Resurrection,” a bloodless coup which seized control of Corsica. The generals threatened to
capture Paris next and install de Gaulle by force.25 In response, 200,000 people, led by the
French Communist Party, demonstrated in the capital to denounce the overt use of military force
and the conditions under which de Gaulle was called to power.26 The regime in Paris,
meanwhile, found itself stuck in an impasse. Government leaders vacillated between several
options. Should they respond to the revolting military factions with force, thereby initiating a
full-blown civil war? Or should they appease the parties in Algeria through a renewed
commitment to the preservation of French Algeria? The final, and most politically viable, option
was to bring back General de Gaulle, the sole figure, the leaders assumed, with enough moral
capital to pacify the rebelling military figures and preserve domestic unity.27
By month‟s end, the tide had shifted in favor of de Gaulle‟s political return. Prime
Minister Pflimlin found himself incapable of reconciling the various political parties for unified
action. President René Coty, meanwhile, continued to pressure Pflimlin for de Gaulle‟s return.
The tensions in Algiers and Paris continued to mount, as the threat of a military coup in Paris
loomed. In the background, meanwhile, de Gaulle seized the opportunity to fuel the controversy.
In a bold statement, given at a press conference in Paris on 19 May 1958, as the leaders in Paris
searched for feasible alternatives, he stated that “the time may have come” for him to be
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“directly useful to France once again.”28 Additionally, despite its apparent illegality, de Gaulle
made no effort to publicly condemn the military insurrection carried out in his name.29 In Paris,
Pflimlin found himself out of feasible options to mitigate the situation. Faced with seemingly
unresolvable problems and increasingly vocal calls for de Gaulle‟s return, he resigned on 28
May.30 The following day President Coty called upon de Gaulle to form a government.31
De Gaulle embarked on his new task without hesitation. Before the National Assembly
on 1 June 1958, he outlined the demands – which included full emergency powers for six months
and the grounds to write a new constitution – for his investiture. Shortly following his speech, in
a vote of 329 to 244, the National Assembly ceded to de Gaulle‟s request and dealt what proved
to be the death knell of the Fourth Republic.32 In his speech de Gaulle described national
conditions starkly:
The rapidly accelerating degradation of the State, the immediate danger to
French unity, Algeria in the throes of trials and emotions, Corsica suffering
from a feverish contagion, opposing movements in Metropolitan France
hourly whipping up their passions and, reinforcing their action, the Army …
shocked by the lack of any real authority, our international position
disparaged even within our alliances – such is the situation of our country.
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At this very moment … [France] finds herself threatened by disruption and
perhaps even civil war.33
At his most melodramatic, de Gaulle made a case for the dire need for his return. In his speech,
he implied that the Fourth Republic‟s political leaders and institutions lacked the capacity to
solve the problems confronting France. He sought to construct the impression that France faced
its current perils as a result of its flawed institutional framework but that, given the means to do
so, he could rectify France‟s course. In the process, he warned of civil war and argued that the
nation needed unity (and a capable unifier). He aimed to position himself, in France‟s time of
need, as the one solely “responsible for the unity, integrity, and independence of France.”34 He
cast himself as the paternal figure – clearly drawing from his wartime legacy, not his dubious
tenure as leader of the RPF – poised to “safeguard the unity of France” and “protect it from
anarchy.” 35
De Gaulle promptly assembled a team meant to deliberate and draft the new constitution.
In June 1958 de Gaulle, and a hand-picked team, headed by Michel Debré and including
members from the leading French political parties, gathered at the Hôtel Matignon in Paris to
begin the drafting process.36 The constitution was, undoubtedly, derivative of Debré‟s
principles outlined in de Gaulle‟s famed speech at Bayeux in 1946. Indeed, the central feature of
the Fifth Republic constitution was the creation of a strong presidential figure, separate from
parliament, meant to lend stability and undermine divisiveness in French politics.
33

“Premier-Designate Charles de Gaulle Outlines His Governmental Program Before the National
Assembly on June 1, 1958” in Major Addresses, 7.
34
Ibid., 8.
35
Lettre au Compte de Paris, 9 Juin 1958, in Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes, et Carnets, Juin 1958Décembre 1960 (Paris: Plon, 1985), 23.
36
Serge Bernstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969, trans. Peter Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 6-7.

26

The final product, the constitution of the Fifth Republic, embodied all of the tenets the
Gaullists valued dearly. First, it instituted a strong presidential position, the personification of
national leadership, elected by universal suffrage and an absolute majority of votes cast. The
president – the sole “protector of the independence of the nation” – possessed the power to select
and dismiss a prime minister at will and, more importantly, had the capacity to dissolve the
National Assembly.37 The final draft of the constitution made it clear that the Gaullists intended
the president – what Debré deemed the “republican monarch” – to serve as the central
government figure, no longer answerable to parliament.38
The creation of the undeniably strong, and independent, presidential figure was a huge
departure from the constitutional framework of the Fourth Republic, which derived its legitimacy
from parliament – the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The president served a
largely a symbolic role in the Fourth Republic and possessed severely limited powers. Equally,
the Prime Minister relied on approval from parliament before he could take power.39 In times of
ministerial conflict there were frequent changes of Prime Ministers, as coalition-based political
majorities shifted. In the twelve years between de Gaulle‟s departure in 1946 and his return in
1958, the Fourth Republic witnessed 22 different Prime Ministers.40 The Gaullists attributed
France‟s every failure, like the virtual collapse in May 1958, to this arrangement which they
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believed undermined Prime Ministerial efforts to project legitimacy and leadership in times of
crisis.
Eventually, by late summer 1958 Debré and his team completed the constitution of the
Fifth Republic. Next, it was put to the test of the French people via referendum. During the
month of September, de Gaulle set out to ensure its adoption. He made two appeals to the nation,
requesting their full-fledged support of the nascent republic. In typical Gaullist fashion, he
outlined the needs of the moment in grandiose terms.41 As he ended his address on 4 September,
1958, he illustrated the magnitude of the decision confronting the French public:
Here, women and men of France, is what inspires and what makes up the
Constitution which, on September 28, will be submitted to your vote. With
all my heart, in the name of France, I ask you to answer “Yes.” If you do
not vote thus, we shall return, that very day, to the bad old ways with which
you are familiar. But if you do, the result will make the Republic strong and
effective … But there will also be, in this positive display of the national
will, the proof that our country is regaining its unity and, by the same token,
its opportunity for grandeur. The world, which understands full well what
importance our decision will have for it, will draw the inevitable conclusion
… A great hope will rise over France. I think it has already risen.42
The importance of the new constitution, according to de Gaulle, transcended the domestic needs
of the country. He framed the significance of the referendum around two weightier themes –
national unity and international opinion. On September 26, on the eve of the referendum, de
Gaulle made one last appeal. “Women and men of France … in asking you to choose
effectiveness of the state and national unity, I believe I am expressing what the many, many
41
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generations that built the nation down through the centuries have hoped for it.”43 History, he
claimed, was on his side.
Leading up to the referendum, the Gaullists had the public on their side. Since his
investiture, de Gaulle had capably painted himself as the answer for all whom, after four years of
uncertain progress, wanted a resolution to the Algerian War (even if differences lingered over
what “resolution” meant). From his tour of Africa and his ambiguous “I have understood you”
speech in Algiers in June 1958, he allayed settler concerns about his commitment to their cause.
In metropolitan France he positioned himself as the only one capable of resolving the colonial
conflict. The public‟s loss of faith in the Fourth Republic meanwhile, thanks to perceived
mismanagement of the economy and the ongoing war, only strengthened the Gaullists‟ bid.44
The Gaullists used the mandate given to them to pursue constitutional reform. By
including prominent members of the leading political parties in the drafting process, the Gaullists
effectively silenced potential opposition to the constitution in the weeks leading up to the
referendum. The PCF provided the only vocal hostility to the constitution which, given the
public‟s investment in de Gaulle, served to alienate the Communist Party further.45 These factors
contributed to a groundswell of support for de Gaulle. Heading into the referendum, 72% of the
public professed confidence in the constitution despite the fact that only 36% felt “sufficiently
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well informed to vote” (compared to 55% who replied negatively).46 On the day of the
referendum, the country headed to the polls and, with an overwhelming majority, approved the
Fifth Republic constitution. Of those who voted, 80% voted “yes.”47 The republic began its life
in auspicious fashion.
With the referendum a success, and after years of hard fought and messy political
activism, the Gaullists ushered in their long-desired constitutional reform. The Gaullists finally
gained the opportunity in 1958 after a war-weary public, invested in the promise of de Gaulle,
proved willing to accede to institutionalized Gaullism. With this, de Gaulle emerged as the
figurehead and personification of the new government. While Debré, the Fifth Republic‟s first
Prime Minister, and others operated the day-to-day administration of the new government, the
theatrics of statecraft were reserved for the “Republican Monarch.” This arrangement allowed
the young Republic to present one singular, stable, and commanding figure – the wartime hero of
Charles de Gaulle – as the main focal point of government, in stark contrast to the ever-changing
rotation of Prime Ministers under the Fourth Republic. The President, left responsible for the
“honor and integrity of France” fashioned a foreign policy meant to portray national renewal and
buttress national support in the early Fifth Republic. Employing a nationalist foreign policy,
which responded to the widespread social anxieties of 1950s France, offered the French
President an opportunity to bolster his claims to embodying national unity.
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SERVICE
OF THE GAULLIST DOMESTIC AGENDA
In 1882, Ernest Renan, the father of French nationalism, lectured about the defining
aspects of nationhood in his speech “What is a Nation?” In it, he proposed the following:
To have common glories in the past and common will in the present; to
have done great things together and to will that we do them again: these are
the conditions essential for being a people…A heritage of glory and regrets
to share in the past; one and the same programme to be realized in the
future. To have suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together is worth more than
customs agreements and frontiers that conform to strategic ideas; and this is
what we understand in spite of racial and linguistic diversity. A moment ago
I said „to have suffered together‟: indeed, suffering in common unites more
than joy. In matters of national memory, mourning has more validity than
triumph, since it imposes duties which demand a common effort. A nation
is therefore the expression of a great solidarity constituted by a feeling for
the common sacrifices that have been made and for those one is prepared to
make again.1
National unity, Renan suggested, owed more to shared sorrow and a collective aspiration, not
political or ethnic homogeneity. This axiom proved central to the Gaullist vision of grandeur at a
time when a generation of French, from 1940 to 1958, faced a seemingly endless array of trials
and challenges. As de Gaulle‟s inaugural address on 8 January 1958 clearly reflected:
During the last half century [France] has been more gravely wounded …
than at any previous time in its history. But now, it has suddenly been
offered an opportunity to emerge from doubt, from dissentions, from
humiliations. And now our country wants to seize this opportunity by
giving general interest precedence over all individual interests and
prejudices.2
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De Gaulle framed the travails of France in a way which minimized the internal struggles and
divisions and instead emphasized commonality, both in sacrifice and general will.3
The notions of unity and revival de Gaulle purposefully evoked in his inaugural address
are central to the argument of this chapter. It contends that the Gaullists, with the founding of the
Fifth Republic, sought to use grandeur, that ambiguous and ill-defined ideal, as the galvanizing
force with which to reinforce their narrative of national rejuvenation. Indeed, it is not
coincidental that de Gaulle reserved his message of France‟s rise from the ashes for his inaugural
address: that day, in Gaullist lore, marked the start of a new epoch. One which, as the Gaullists
hoped to portray, signaled a seismic shift from the follies of the Fourth Republic (and earlier) to
an era of governmental stability and common ambition under the unifying force of President de
Gaulle. As Chapter One sought to demonstrate, constitutional reform proved the central ambition
of de Gaulle and his closest advisors (Debré especially). Chapter Two seeks to illustrate how
nationalism and foreign policy served to legitimize the Gaullist Fifth Republic through popular
support. It serves to demonstrate why foreign policy, among other things, proved central to the
Gaullist narrative of national renewal and unity with which they used to bolster domestic
support.
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THE NEED FOR NATIONALISM AND GRANDEUR
With de Gaulle‟s return to power in 1958, the Gaullists saw a revival of nationalism as an
integral part of their efforts to unify the republic and to gain legitimacy for the new institutions.
The Algerian War and the rapid, if uneven, social change and economic resurgence of the 1950s
– to say nothing of the unresolved cleavage created during World War II – divided the country
along fierce ideological lines. Moreover, the Gaullists believed the “party system” of the Fourth
Republic failed to provide the French people with an inspiring, galvanizing national vision in
response to these challenges. With this in mind, the Gaullists saw an opportunity to employ
nationalistic themes which emphasized commonality and downplayed societal differences. They
aimed to foster national unity and counter competing social pressures while simultaneously
juxtaposing the Fifth Republic from its defunct predecessor. Additionally, nationalism, displayed
in both rhetoric and tangible (if often ineffectual) acts and policies, served to garner public
support, and with it legitimacy, for the leader of a newly stable and active republic.
Nationalism, in general, serves as an effective tool for galvanizing support for governing
institutions – in this case for the Gaullist Fifth Republic – and reinforcing societal cohesion.
Historian Eric Hobsbawm once argued that nationalist rhetoric‟s “very vagueness and lack of
programmatic content gives it a potentially universal support within its own community.”4 De
Gaulle and his team understood that nationalism‟s universal appeal could work to further
integrate factions of society into a broader national community. Reinforcement of a common
national message, via nationalistic themes and rhetoric, could then help counter societal tensions.
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Equally, if large portions of society attached themselves to the nationalistic themes emanating
from national leadership, legitimacy is thus conferred upon the state, its institutions, and
programs.5
De Gaulle understood the galvanizing potential of nationalism. When, for instance, his
Minister of Information, Alain Peyrefitte, noted the positive effect of nationalistic language in
his rhetoric, de Gaulle explained the use enthusiastically:
Of course, that‟s what happens! The French again become French! We live
in difficult times. It is necessary to rise above special interests. If we divide
ourselves, if we quarrel, we are lost. One must create the conditions for the
union of the French, and to do that one must awaken their national feelings.
When the French divide themselves and quarrel, I speak to them of France.6
Nationalism, with its unifying potential, offered de Gaulle and the Gaullists an opportunity to
drive home a common, if generic, message which reached all levels of French society.
Nationalist discourse offered the Gaullists a chance to gain appeal on all sides of the political
spectrum and among all factions and, if not, make it difficult for opposing factions to offer a
compelling counterargument.
Gaullist nationalism frequently hinged on notions of greatness and the need for the
French people to strive for grandeur. De Gaulle conjured notions of grandeur, in his rhetoric and
actions, because he understood its ideals possessed an attraction on both sides of the French
political spectrum which, when employed effectively, could strengthen his bid for unity. He
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argued, for instance, that the French had “a need to feel pride in France.”7 This idea had the
potential to speak to French men and women of all stripes, despite competing visions for the
future (from European integration to France‟s Cold War stance and decolonization).
De Gaulle‟s notion of national pride tapped into the consensus, which blurred the lines
between the French right and left, that presupposed that France remained exceptional and
occupied a special place amongst nations, even if relegated to a reduced international role in the
postwar era.8 All societal factions could agree that the French nation deserved self-respect and,
with it, international respect. For many, this meant preserving an independent voice and identity
– and resistance to a muted and subordinate role vulnerable to the dictates of others (whether in
the machinations of the European Common Market or the NATO alliance) – even in the face of
diminished global influence. Grandeur, of course, championed this notion of national self-worth.
De Gaulle‟s appeal to these sensibilities, at a time when France grappled with its own
insecurities, had far-reaching potential.
The Gaullists believed nationalism and grandeur could construct a narrative which
appealed to many and subdued ideological differences in favor of a common ideal. Certainly, the
constant rhetoric of national renewal and grandeur did much to signify a changed political
atmosphere and illustrate the departure from the Fourth Republic. These concepts of nationalism,
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as we shall see, influenced the formation of Gaullist foreign policy. But first, we must turn our
attention to a brief contextualization of France‟s role in the Cold War.
FRANCE AND THE COLD WAR
Before analyzing the formation of Gaullist foreign policy, one needs to define France‟s
relationship to the Cold War. It is essential to note that France‟s perception of the Cold War and
its own interests were starkly different from that of its Western allies. The United States emerged
from World War II intact and confident, able and inclined, by 1947, to focus its attention on
waging the Cold War.9 In contrast, France emerged from the war physically and financially
devastated and torn by societal divisions exacerbated by the bitter civil war that ensued during
the Occupation.10 Adding further difficulties, almost immediately following World War II the
French launched into an unending series of colonial conflicts: first a war in Indochina (19461954) and then, with barely a pause, the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962).11 Thus, it is
perhaps not surprising that, given the imperatives of domestic reconstruction and preserving its
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crumbling empire, France was not prepared to commit itself wholeheartedly to the US‟ Cold War
agenda.
In the early days of the Cold War, the US and France were at odds from a strategic
standpoint as well. While the US fixed its gaze on the Soviet Union and its perceived threats to
US interests, France remained preoccupied by its Eastern neighbor, Germany.12 The shocking
defeat of 1940 and the subsequent occupation proved too fresh a memory for fears of German
resurgence to be allayed.13 Contrarily, the French, unlike the US, viewed the Soviet Union more
positively. Since the late nineteenth century, Russia (and eventually the Soviet Union) served, on
numerous occasions, as a traditional ally to France and an Eastern counterweight to a strong
German presence in Central Europe.14 Even at the height of the Cold War, the majority of the
French population harbored no distrust or disdain for the Soviet Union.15
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Thus, given France‟s moderate view of the Soviet Union, France‟s drift into the Western
camp in the late 1940s was, in no way, an obvious choice. The country fell into NATO more out
of need than by ideological preference. The US‟ willingness to offer Western Europe funds via
the Marshall Plan and other means, connected with the valuable ties to the US through French
businessmen like Jean Monnet made the US appear preferential to the governing parties at a time
when France was in desperate need of aid.16 Meanwhile, with French plans for German
containment failing to gain traction following the war, the US offered the only alternative answer
to fears of a revanchist Eastern neighbor. This became more apparent thanks to perceived Soviet
intransigence in 1947-1948: the creation of the Soviet Communist Information Bureau – the socalled “Cominform” – in 1947, the refusal of Marshall Aid in Eastern Europe, and the blockade
of Berlin in 1948.17 Circumstances, therefore, did far more than any natural inclination to dictate
France‟s drift westward in the late 1940s.
The tepid enthusiasm for the Atlantic Alliance felt in large segments of society reflected
this sentiment. There existed, for many, a lingering belief that France should maintain a neutral
stance. When asked in November 1958, for instance, whether they felt France‟s “allegiance
should be toward the West, toward the East, or neither,” 48% of Frenchmen responded “neither”
compared to only 24% who chose the West.18 Whereas many French were glad to obtain a
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security agreement from the US with regard to Germany, they were less excited about entering
into America‟s broader Cold War campaign.
GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR
The previous section served to complicate our perception of France‟s role in the Cold
War and to remind the reader that anxieties came with equal force from both directions (east and
west), which served to obscure, for many in France, the rigid delineations the bloc system
presupposed. Thus, French ambivalence about the Cold War could not have failed to influence
de Gaulle‟s diplomatic agenda. De Gaulle sought to orchestrate a foreign policy which would
elicit the greatest domestic response, given France‟s limited ability to influence international
affairs. As Henry Kissinger noted, “Governing a country racked by a generation of conflict and
decades of humiliation, de Gaulle judged policies not so much according to pragmatic criteria as
according to whether they could contribute to the restoration of French self-esteem.”19 The
overriding goal of ensuring governmental legitimacy and the appearance of national unity
directed de Gaulle towards a policy which had broad popular appeal.
In this effort, given the strength of the French Communist Party, confronting the Soviet
Union would have proven divisive and thus undermined Gaullist efforts to project de Gaulle as a
national unifier. On a practical level too, France, a mid-size power of limited influence, could do
little to alter Soviet intransigence or hasten détente. Lastly, given de Gaulle‟s domestic
orientation, it is worth noting, as political scientist Philip Cerny asserted, that his foreign policy
“ought not be so grandiose as to upset the international system in such a way as to cause other
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states to injure France.”20 It remained imperative, therefore, to devise a strategy that elicited the
strongest domestic reaction, one which had broad appeal, without actually disturbing
international stability. With this goal in mind, the Soviet Union would have made an impractical
target for his foreign policy of grandeur, both ideologically and strategically.
Therefore, when devising his foreign policy, de Gaulle understood that confronting the
American-led NATO alliance offered the greatest benefits for arousing French nationalist
sentiment and achieving a palatable consensus amongst disparate political and ideological
factions. As we have seen, the French did not universally perceive the Soviet Union as an
adversary. It thus lacked the galvanizing potential that de Gaulle sought in developing his foreign
policy of grandeur. Contrarily, the Atlantic Alliance drew criticism from across the political
spectrum (from the left who resented France‟s western orientation to the right who felt France
should play a more fruitful role within the alliance). Equally, lingering factors fueled rampant
anti-Americanism in France that cut across political lines. These aspects, as we shall see,
combined with France‟s increasing role in NATO in the late 1950s, converged to make the USled Atlantic Alliance the optimal target for de Gaulle‟s foreign policy goals.
For one, there was frustration among the French political elite regarding the US‟s
influence – and interference – in European politics. Many felt exasperation toward the United
States‟ role in advocating the European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and its
seemingly preferential treatment toward Germany during the EDC debates.21 Equally, the 1956
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Anglo-French expedition in Suez was largely thwarted by American pressure.22 Moreover,
Washington‟s constant public disapproval of France‟s colonial ambitions left the French
leadership with the impression of an apparent abandonment by their supposed ally.
On a societal level, meanwhile, there existed an omnipresent anxiety regarding the
perceived influence of American culture – what some leftists deemed “Coca-Colonization” – on
the French way of life throughout the 1950s.23 Part of the anti-Americanism stemmed from
circumstances. While searching for an identity in the shadow of the humiliation wrought by
World War II, the French were confronted by an influx of products and media from the selfconfident and triumphant US.24 Equally, the perceived impact of American business practices
during reconstruction in the 1950s spawned fiery movements, like the Poujadists, who viewed
American-style capitalism as incompatible with the French lifestyle.25 The installation of
American military bases and personnel littered throughout France, meanwhile, represented a
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tangible encroachment by the Americans, adding credence to the many other anxieties regarding
America‟s negative, if overstated, influence.26
Challenging the conventions of the US-led NATO alliance offered an effective way
for de Gaulle to galvanize factions on the left and the right and restore confidence in the
Republic. These efforts tapped into common resentment found in many outlets regarding
America‟s economic, cultural, and military influence. De Gaulle‟s insistence on independence
and freedom of action attracted right-leaning French, like the Gaullist Union pour la nouvelle
République (UNR) and the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), who believed France
should have a greater international role. His hints of anti-Americanism appealed to the leftists
like the French Communist Party and, to a lesser extent, the socialist Section Française de
l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO).27
On a more practical level, meanwhile, the Atlantic Alliance suited de Gaulle‟s goals
because it was within the Alliance where de Gaulle‟s diplomacy could have the most impact. By
the late 1950s, the geopolitical situation had changed in a way that left Europe poised to play a
greater role in international affairs. Western Europe had, by then, recovered economically from
the lingering effects of World War II and had begun an unprecedented streak of tremendous
economic growth. Meanwhile, with developments in Soviet atomic technology – the launch of
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Sputnik and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles – the United States faced a
perceived nuclear parity and could no longer act as sole protector of Western Europe.28 These
factors coalesced to provoke the US to seek further cooperation and integration among Western
European NATO members as increased Cold War tensions placed “the greatest premium on
Western unity.”29 This, in turn, spelled an increased importance of France within US Cold War
strategy because, without France, NATO would become “a geographic absurdity,” to quote one
Newsweek editorial.30 As a result, de Gaulle‟s decisions of non-integration and non-compliance
seemed all the more potent, lending credence to the perception of renewed strength and vigor in
the Gaullist Fifth Republic.
The Atlantic Alliance, furthermore, provided the ideal framework for exercising a foreign
policy meant for domestic consumption. De Gaulle knew he could challenge the NATO alliance
directly and undermine US conception of Western unity (Western nations aligned under de facto
US leadership) without jeopardizing French security in any real way. His actions bore no risk of
escalating hostilities (if not aggravation) from France‟s allies. Indeed, the US‟s greater plans for
the preservation of peace in Western Europe demanded stability in France, which de Gaulle‟s
return wrought. The various US diplomatic leaders, many of whom had known de Gaulle and his
tendencies since World War II, understood that de Gaulle‟s nationalistic inclinations, though
vexing, were preferable to a collapse of French government or a civil war, the likes of which
seemed imminent in spring 1958.
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US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for instance, remarked in a Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations hearing on 14 January 1959 that de Gaulle‟s revival of France was “a very
important and significant fact.” But, noting that “one hardly gets anything for nothing,” he added
that, as a result, the US would have “some complications and difficulties” with de Gaulle‟s
“extreme[ly] nationalistic point of view.”31 De Gaulle thus proved able to appease both his
domestic constituency, through his rejection of American leadership and his insistence on
national independence, and also France‟s NATO allies through his constant reaffirmation of “the
deep-seated solidarity which exists among Western powers.”32
Additionally, de Gaulle knew that he could undermine NATO‟s unity without any
danger from the Soviet bloc. He understood that the USSR no longer posed any genuine threat to
Western Europe. Despite excitable rhetoric emanating from both superpowers, de Gaulle
recognized the Cold War had settled into a stalemate and neither superpower had any inclination
to undermine the arrangement. He likened the Soviet Union‟s policies in Eastern Europe to
eighteenth century Russian imperialism and not to an ideologically-driven superpower intent on
global revolution. Moreover, he questioned how the Soviet Union would set out to conquer the
economically resurgent and stable Western European nations when, by 1958, it still “had not
conquered the satellites.”33 Equally, Soviet advances in nuclear technology and the resulting
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perception of parity with the US precluded the threat of nuclear war.34 Later events, like Nikita
Khrushchev‟s scuttling of the May 1960 summit in Paris and the building of the Berlin Wall in
1961, reflected the Soviet Union‟s increasingly defensive stance, which only served to convince
de Gaulle further of the preservation of the Cold War status quo.35 By 1963, de Gaulle was
convinced that the Soviet Union‟s “time had passed.”36
Given these considerations, it becomes clear why de Gaulle made the NATO alliance the
centerpiece of his foreign policy of grandeur. He understood that challenging the existing order
within the alliance offered the greatest opportunities for wide-ranging domestic support without
risking French security or upsetting the international order. Additionally, French diplomatic
decisions carried the most influence within the NATO alliance. The consternation and anxiety de
Gaulle‟s decisions caused his Anglo-American allies served to strengthen Gaullist claims of
renewal and resurgence under the Fifth Republic. France had much less means elsewhere (like
the Soviet Union for example) to draw the same ire and, therefore, the same domestic effect.
With a strategy in place, then, de Gaulle and his diplomatic advisors moved to lay the
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groundwork for the foreign policy of grandeur that marked his presidency in 1959 and
thereafter.
1958: SETTING THE STAGE FOR GRANDEUR
In late September 1958, both US President Dwight Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan received a letter and attached memorandum from the new French Premier
which proposed dramatic changes to the Atlantic Alliance. The memorandum, dated 17
September 1958, cited the perceived shortcomings of the NATO alliance as seen from France‟s
own interests. De Gaulle used the events from the summer of 1958, namely the bungled AngloAmerican operation in Lebanon and Communist China‟s shelling of Taiwanese offshore islands,
as a pretext to support his argument. The scope of the NATO alliance, confined to Europe, was
sorely inadequate to handle the global nature of Cold War crises. The alliance did not extend to
cover broad swathes of the globe, including The Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the
Pacific, all of which, de Gaulle argued, were the “indivisible responsibilities of France.”37
With the changes brought on by the Cold War, the scope of NATO, de Gaulle concluded,
needed reconsidering. After drawing this conclusion, he proceeded to propose a reorganization of
the Alliance which soon became the source of controversy among NATO member states. The
memorandum stated:
France cannot consider that NATO, under its present form, satisfies the
security requirements of the Free World and, particularly, her own. It seems
to her necessary that at a world-wide political and strategic level, there
should be instituted an organization comprising the United States, Britain,
and France. This organization would, on the one hand, take common
37
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decisions on political questions dealing with world security and … apply
strategic action plans, particularly as regards the use of nuclear weapons …
The French Government considers such an organization of security as
indispensable. From now on it subordinates to it all development of its
current participation in NATO and proposes, if it appears necessary to
arrive at it, to invoke the procedure of the revision of the North Atlantic
Treaty in conformity with article 12.38
Indeed, what he proposed was nothing short of a triumvirate of power rested in the hands of
France and the Anglo-Americans. More importantly, any future participation by France in
NATO, he noted, hinged on this proposal.
The September “Memorandum on the Directory,” as it came to be called, spelled, for
many contemporaries and historians alike, the decisive break with the foreign policy of the
Fourth Republic and the inauguration of de Gaulle‟s new policy. Certainly, de Gaulle himself
intentionally helped seed this perception. “As early as September 14, 1958 [erroneously dated],”
he recalled in his memoirs, “I hoisted my colors,” framed as if to mark the start of a new epoch.39
But, despite de Gaulle‟s efforts to shape the memory of the early Fifth Republic, he could hardly
charge that the rationale behind his September Memorandum was a break with the policies
pursued within NATO by the Fourth Republic.
As French historian Maurice Vaïsse reminds us, French confidence in NATO‟s system of
integration had waned greatly prior to the return of de Gaulle, most notably as a result of the
conclusions drawn from the failed 1956 Anglo-French operation in Suez. Equally, the lack of
Anglo-American support for French operations in North Africa helped shape French desires for

38

Ibid., 193.
Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1971), 202.
39

47

joint leadership and an expansion of NATO‟s scope as early as 1956 under Premier Guy
Mollet.40 Indeed, the leaders of the Fourth Republic were largely disillusioned with the
functioning of the alliance, something that led them to numerous proposals of their own for
increased cooperation with their Anglo-American counterparts. As late as May 1958, while the
Fourth Republic was besieged by the crisis of the army in Algeria, Prime Minister Pierre Pflimlin
and Foreign Secretary René Pleven proposed heightened cooperation among the three powers on
the basis of France‟s progress in the nuclear field, similar to the Gaullist proposal of 1958.41 De
Gaulle could therefore hardly claim with authenticity that the Fourth Republic had not made
strides of its own to alter the NATO alliance.

From a strategic standpoint, the September Memorandum was hardly original, echoing
many Fourth Republic grievances. The September Memorandum did not mark a genuine shift in
French strategic reasoning, but it provided the pretext for all Gaullist foreign policy that would
follow. As de Gaulle noted, France‟s participation within the alliance depended on the changes
proposed. It seems likely that he did not expect Eisenhower to accede to the vast proposals,
which not only outlined a vast reorganization of the alliance but also institutionalized the
triumvirate leadership at the expense of the remaining NATO allies.42 When Eisenhower finally
replied on 20 October 1958, he sympathized with the French position, but confirmed that NATO
40
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could not adopt the proposed changes. Eisenhower feared that such reorganization would lend
the impression to other NATO nations that “basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are
being made without their participation.”43

Certainly there is reason to believe the Gaullists expected rejection and that, with this
denial, they were handed the desired grounds to begin the withdrawal from NATO‟s integration.
For one, they already knew how the US felt on the matter. During his first encounter with US
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Paris on 5 July 1958, de Gaulle broached the subject of
tripartism. In response, and without hesitation, Dulles firmly elucidated “the dangers of such a
course,” adding that “nothing of the nature … should be established as a formal institution.”44
One can therefore hardly doubt that the French strategists knew full well what reception the
memorandum would have in London and Washington.

So, if not a greater role in NATO, what did the Gaullists hope to gain from the September
Memorandum? Several years later, in a conversation with his Minister of Information, Alain
Peyrefitte, de Gaulle explained the reasoning behind the September Memorandum:
That memorandum was a procedure of diplomatic pressure. I searched,
then, to find a means of leaving NATO and reclaiming my freedom which
the Fourth Republic had lost. At the time, I asked for the moon. I was
certain that they wouldn‟t grant it to me. The Anglo-Americans would like
to be able to use their force as they wish … What they want is to dominate
us. But in not responding to my memorandum, they allowed me to make
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some arrangements which led me to move away from NATO, little by little.
I could not have done it if I hadn‟t first endured that refusal.45
De Gaulle‟s Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville later reaffirmed these sentiments,
noting that de Gaulle was “under no illusion” regarding the eventuality of the proposal. From a
practical standpoint as well, there was reason to doubt that the alliance, according to de Gaulle‟s
specifications, would meet French expectations. As Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary-General of
NATO, later reflected in his memoirs: “There were … reasons why, in my opinion, the
triumvirate scheme was not viable. It seemed unlikely that de Gaulle would always be prepared
to bow, in the conduct of international affairs, to the decisions of his two Anglo-Saxon
partners.”46 Taken together, these reflections illustrate the intent of the September Memorandum.
Clearly, de Gaulle and his advisors did not expect to emerge from the negotiations with a
heightened role in the alliance. Instead, it seems, the Gaullists planned to use the AngloAmerican reluctance as an excuse for the bold actions taken in 1959 and beyond.

Despite his refusal on 20 October 1958, Eisenhower sought not to alienate de Gaulle. Far
from accepting the far-reaching proposals put forth by de Gaulle, he approved exploratory low
level diplomatic talks between the three countries. This was, however, too little too late. Even
before de Gaulle received Eisenhower‟s polite, if blunt, refusal on 20 October, he had already
reaffirmed his plans for France to have a “national” defense during a meeting with his National
Defense Council on 13 October.47 Noting that his Anglo-American counterparts had “replied
evasively,” de Gaulle moved to carry out his foreign policy of grandeur, orchestrated with his
45
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domestic audience in mind. With the expected response to the memorandum behind him, “there
was nothing,” he later recalled, “to prevent [France] from taking action.”48 The French Premier
thus looked toward the year of 1959, when he could embark on a series of diplomatic moves
designed to build upon the Gaullist narrative of renewal and the desire to show the newly
inaugurated Fifth Republic in full action.
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CHAPTER 3: DE GAULLE’S FOREIGN POLICY OF GRANDEUR
On 8 January 1959, Charles de Gaulle was sworn in as the first president of the Fifth
French Republic. His inaugural address highlighted the hardships France had faced in its recent
past. He also spoke of the opportunities which awaited his country, thanks largely to the new
institutions afforded it. Later in the month, he proudly announced to his countrymen that “a
rejuvenated France is once more taking up the reins of history.”1 Accompanying these remarks,
de Gaulle embarked on his foreign policy of grandeur. The intent was simple: demonstrate a
clear juxtaposition of demeanor and policy between the Fourth and Fifth Republics which
coincided with the demise of the old and the inauguration of the new.
Beneath the surface, the continuities between the Fourth and Fifth Republics were
numerous.2 Politically, however, de Gaulle aimed to make this less obvious. The framework of
the Fifth Republic constitution gave de Gaulle the opportunity to exploit certain arenas, including
foreign policy which was the President‟s domaine réservé. While his ministers and advisors
worked toward the same goal elsewhere – André Malraux in the Ministry of Culture and Jacques
Reuff in the economic sphere, to cite two examples – de Gaulle employed foreign policy in the
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service of Gaullist myth-making concerning the image of national renewal. He designed the
foreign policy of grandeur with two goals in mind. The first was to garner support for the Fifth
Republic by carrying out policies which had broad popular appeal. The second intent was to
further discredit the Fourth Republic. By declaring the need to reclaim national independence, it
was implied however subtly, that the Fourth Republic had somehow lost it. And, of course,
somewhere between the two goals laid the potential for substantiating claims to national unity.
1959 ACT ONE: THE FRENCH MEDITERRANEAN FLEET
Following the inauguration, de Gaulle and his advisors quickly proceeded to demonstrate
France‟s reassertion of independence, first by withdrawing the French Mediterranean Naval Fleet
from NATO integrated command and later by demanding the removal of US nuclear weapons
stationed in France. The actions taken in 1959 were certainly limited in practical effect. Despite
aggravating his Anglo-American counterparts, the decisions did little more than make for
interesting headlines. Arguably, though, it was this aspect which de Gaulle regarded most
importantly. How better could the French President contrast the new republic with the old than to
challenge the existing order in a highly visible way? His decisions, far removed from the staid
and muted negotiations which often accompanied diplomacy, capably fixed national and
international attention on the actions of the French President. The consternation his decisions
elicited from France‟s allies served to reaffirm the ostensibly dramatic shift in French leadership
de Gaulle had hoped to portray.
The first significant diplomatic act came on 6 March 1959. In a telegram to the US
Department of State, the French announced a change to the status of France‟s naval forces in the
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Mediterranean whereby France‟s naval forces, in the event of war, would remain under national
command, contrary to NATO‟s framework of integration. Prior to the withdrawal, a portion of
France‟s Mediterranean fleet contributed to the integrated Allied Forces Mediterranean
(AFMED), under the command of a British admiral based in Malta. This subordination to a
British superior became a source of irritation throughout the 1950s, given France‟s sizable
presence in the Mediterranean. The frustration was further exacerbated when, in the late 1950s,
the British reduced a large portion of its NATO naval forces allocated to AFMED, leaving the
French fleet as the largest in the Mediterranean after the US Sixth fleet which itself was not
integrated into NATO.3
Despite lingering frustrations over the integration of France‟s naval forces, the telegram
cited France‟s responsibility to defend the French community and protect vital oil supply-lines
from the Sahara as the main rationale for the decision. The demands placed on the fleet
stemming from the “struggle to pacify Algeria,” the telegram claimed, also played a role in the
decision. Throughout, the telegram alluded subtly to the same complaints raised in the
September Memorandum regarding the scope of the alliance.4
But should one accept the telegram‟s claims at face value? The diplomatic record from
the period suggests otherwise. For one, the claim that France‟s actions were taken because “the
zone of possible NATO action does not extend to the south of the Mediterranean,” proved
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unfounded.5 Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly stated, the scope of the alliance
covered not only “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,” but also “the
Algerian Departments of France.”6 Moreover in time of peace (and the Cold War had indeed
established a virtual peace), individual NATO countries were able to use their fleets as they
deemed fit – the alliance did not prevent this. Consequently, the decision simply “de-earmarked”
France‟s fleet from potential future wartime use.7
The private correspondence tells a similar story. As early as 23 January 1959, the French
Ambassador in Washington, Hervé Alphand, informed US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
that de Gaulle felt “the French naval forces should be as free as the US Mediterranean forces,
notably the Sixth Fleet.”8 In the meeting, Alphand made no mention of the Algerian War.
Instead, what seemed important was the status of France‟s fleet which, unlike the US‟s Sixth
Fleet, was integrated into NATO‟s Mediterranean command. In the days leading up to the
official announcement, the French Ambassador revealed that “this latest move was a reflection of
the fact that France preferred „cooperation‟ to „integration.‟”9 US officials too, in their
assessment, felt the impending action was simply “a matter of French national pride.”10 Their
analysis, like Alphand‟s earlier analysis, contained no mention of the Algerian War. It seems
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clear, then, that the desire to display the Fifth Republic‟s newfound policy of independence – not
the exigencies of the Algerian War – guided the decision on the fleet withdrawal.
For his part, in his first press conference of the year on 25 March 1959, de Gaulle seized
the opportunity to publicly castigate the alliance for its perceived shortcomings. France, in
withdrawing its fleet, he implied, simply restored its rightful place amongst nations. He
proceeded to remind the audience that Britain and the United States, “the two other great world
powers of the Atlantic Alliance,” had both withheld the “greater part of their naval forces from
being integrated into NATO.” France, as he saw it, had no reason to act differently. He made it
clear that France‟s action on the fleet was not anomalous; the withdrawal marked the start of a
new era. When a reporter asked if France would take a similar stance on its ground and air
forces, de Gaulle responded coyly “Well, you will see what happens.”11
It is clear, then, that the new administration of the Fifth Republic had more in mind then
those cited in the 6 March telegram. Nothing within the NATO context directly constrained
France from fulfilling the stated needs while also willfully complying with NATO integration.
Instead, the decision played directly into their new, larger domestic aim of portraying a unified
and rejuvenated France. The move fit nicely into the larger constructed Gaullist narrative of
France reclaiming its independence, and with it its voice, after the failings of the Third and
Fourth Republics. The action left opposing domestic political forces with little to muster dissent,
thus strengthening de Gaulle‟s claims to embodying national unity.
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Fittingly, the administration‟s decision became the centerpiece of French national
newspapers barely a week after the pronouncement weaved its way through NATO‟s diplomatic
channels. Both Le Monde and Le Figaro, for instance, devoted several pages, including the
centerpiece of the front page, to analysis of the decision.12 The newspapers offered an array of
coverage and commentaries on the decision. Often, without expressly endorsing the
government‟s position, the articles framed the NATO system of integration in a manner which
lent credence to the President‟s complaints. French commentators, it seemed, sympathized with
the Gaullist skepticism regarding institutionalized subordination within the alliance.
As Le Figaro wrote, “We note, for our part, that the French initiative is likely to open
new prospects for solving the questions of cooperation posed officially by General de Gaulle last
September. Many will be pleased about it. Others will regret that the moment chosen [for
withdrawal] wasn‟t made with a perfect sense of timing [given the outbreak of tensions over
Berlin].”13 Far from critical, the article recognized that the move had widespread appeal.
The decision struck a chord with the writers of Le Monde too. One article from the March
15-16 edition noted that “the hierarchy of the Atlantic [Alliance] placed all commands, at all
levels, under the orders of an American leader.” “Our naval forces,” he added, “find ourselves in
the same situation to those of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, reduced to responsibility of a
subordinate sector.”14 The article confirmed de Gaulle‟s claim that the alliance not only rested
power in American hands, but also subordinated France in a fashion akin to three tangential
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NATO members. It also unwittingly revealed anxieties about France‟s perceived decline. De
Gaulle‟s position thus struck a chord with a public who, regardless of political stripe, did not see
France, with a history of influence and empire, in the same light as countries like Greece and
Italy. Moreover, the move fooled nobody: the article noted that, to some, the initiative was seen
“much less for immediate needs than by the desire of the Fifth Republic to assume all the
responsibilities related to its role as a great power.”15 As the article suggested, the French public
recognized de Gaulle‟s efforts and responded favorably to the nationalist elements of his
policies.
Not to be forgotten, outside observers also noted of the action. As one New York Times
article keenly observed, the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet “was probably as
popular with the French public, currently in the throes of a marked nationalist syndrome, as it
was unpopular and worrisome to France‟s fourteen allies in NATO. Not a single important voice
was raised publicly against the action. And, to the average Frenchman, the news probably
sounded like a brass band chorus of „La Marseillaise.‟”16 It was clear that de Gaulle‟s decision
had garnered national and international attention, projected an image of France that largely
matched his rhetoric of national rejuvenation, and quieted potential domestic dissent. By
fashioning a foreign policy which had widespread domestic appeal, de Gaulle and his advisors
brought together factions of society (like the PCF) which would have otherwise opposed his
ventures.
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1959 ACT TWO: THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN NUCLEAR STOCKPILES
Within months, de Gaulle took a stand against the storage of foreign nuclear stockpiles in
France. The events associated with the decision were drawn out over a series of months and
therefore lacked the media potency of the pronouncement on the French Fleet. It was nonetheless
much aligned with not only the Gaullists‟ broader narrative but also public opinion. The debate
concerned the storage of nine US F100 bomber squadrons located in France. In light of the
escalating Berlin crisis, General Lauris Norstad, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander of
Europe, deemed it necessary to equip the nine squadrons stationed in France with nuclear
warheads.17 This line of reasoning, for all its strategic merit, was at odds with the Gaullist view
that France and France alone should possess control over nuclear stockpiles in France.
In analyzing the decision, one must see the process of withdrawing the nuclear stockpiles
and accompanying bomber squadrons within the broader context of France‟s pursuit of an
independent nuclear strike force. Unfortunately, the complexities associated with this matter,
worthy of an examination of their own, are beyond the limits of this study. At the simplest, the
French nuclear program had its origins in the Fourth Republic. By the time of de Gaulle‟s return,
the leaders of the Fourth Republic scheduled the first test of a French bomb for early 1960. The
leaders of the Fourth Republic pursued a nuclear weapons program for a number of reasons. De
Gaulle, meanwhile, saw the force de frappe, as it was called, as primarily a political tool; it was
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to be the centerpiece of his policy of national independence and his reorientation of the French
armed forces.18
Once the dust had settled regarding the French Mediterranean fleet, de Gaulle acted on
his objection to NATO nuclear stockpiles on French soil. In a letter to Eisenhower on 25 May
1959, de Gaulle noted France‟s concerns. The letter alluded to many of the irreconcilable
concerns raised in his September Memorandum from the previous year, namely the lack of a
joint tripartite leadership and NATO‟s limited scope. De Gaulle also tied the US‟ resistance to
France‟s pursuit of an atomic weapon to his decision. As he stated:
[France] obviously cannot entirely entrust her life or death to any other state
whatsoever, even the most friendly. For this reason, France feels it is
essential that she participate, if the case were to arise, in any decision which
might be taken by her allies to use atomic missiles … Until she has been
able to conclude with the United States and with Great Britain the
agreements which seem necessary to her on this subject, she cannot consent
to such projectiles being stored on her territory and used from there unless
she herself has complete and permanent control over them. As I have …
[written] to you previously, I believe that these problems might be solved
between us as soon as there has been established between the United States
and Great Britain and France organized cooperation in political matters and
in strategic matters for the security of the world.19
De Gaulle justified the decision by placing the onus on the United States to do one of two things:
either accede to his previous call for tripartite leadership and nuclear cooperation or accept his
decision to further France‟s aims for independence.
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Certainly, there is reason to believe, as some scholars have argued,20 that the ultimatum
was sincere in its attempt to facilitate the creation of a French bomb. Regardless, the decision
served the aim argued here. The leadership of the Fifth Republic‟s broader goal was to create an
atmosphere of nationalistic self-respect within France that contrasted his foreign policy, and
therefore the Fifth Republic, with the image of a prostrate France under the Fourth Republic
acquiescing to American dictates. After all, the issue in question was France‟s apparent
subordination institutionalized through NATO‟s system of integration. Therefore, if the
Americans had accepted his requests, an obvious longshot to say the least, he would have
enhanced French prestige and facilitated the creation of a French nuclear weapon without
committing France to any integration. Or, if the Americans responded evasively to his requests
and instead withdrew the weapons in question, he could claim a diplomatic victory.21
Norstad and others consequently opted for the latter option, thereby handing de Gaulle
his second tangible foreign policy success in a matter of several months. By early June, a sizable
portion of the air forces had moved to West Germany. The entire redeployment, which took
about six months, quietly shifted the nine air squadrons and their accompanying nuclear
warheads to bases in West Germany and the United Kingdom.22 All told, de Gaulle‟s decision
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bore no adverse strategic consequences for the alliance, though Norstad fumed about France‟s
perceived obstinacy when “the vote is against them by 14 to 1” within the alliance.23
Domestically, in light of the frustrations concerning the presence of foreign military
personnel and weapons, the decision to remove foreign nuclear stockpiles was quite popular.
Leftists in the country rejected the pervasive influence America presented while the voices of the
far right, ardent defenders of French colonialism, disdained the installation of American military
bases throughout France, an ostensible colonization of its own. Beyond the anti-Americanism
presented by the political margins remained the broad swathe of the general public who
maintained a distinct inclination for neutralism and non-alignment within the context of the Cold
War.24 With this in mind, an overwhelming 69% of citizens polled responded that they approved
of de Gaulle‟s decision on foreign nuclear stockpiles, compared to only 4% who disapproved
(27% had no answer).25 To the majority of the French, the presence of foreign nuclear stockpiles
seemed more like an unwarranted provocation than an added security measure.
The decision to demand the removal of foreign nuclear stockpiles from France served the
Gaullists‟ goal to substantiate the narrative crafted by the architects of the early Fifth Republic –
Debré like Malraux – regarding the return of political independence (and therefore grandeur)
from prior subordination. Later in the year, on 3 November 1959, as the last of the US bombers
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were departing French soil, de Gaulle gave an impassioned and nationalistic speech to the cadets
of the Saint-Cyr Military Academy about the need for French independence. He said in part:
The defense of France must be French. This is a need that has not always
been very familiar during the last few years, I know, but it must return to
such. If war comes to pass for a nation like France, so be it. Its effort must
be its effort. If it was otherwise, our nation would contradict everything it
has stood for since its founding, with its role, with the respect it has for
itself, with its soul. Naturally, French defense would be, should the case
arise, joined with that of other nations. This is only natural. But it is
essential that this defense be our own, that France is defended by itself, for
itself, and in its own way.26
The speech acknowledged, with a touch of remorse, the dependence France had repeatedly had
on outside powers in recent decades, from the failures of the Third and Fourth Republics to the
abhorrence of the Vichy regime and even the shortcomings of the Free French movement and its
reliance on the allied forces. But he also implied that now, given his return, France would pursue
its own defense policy, in an effort to discredit the previous regime. What he failed to mention,
of course, was that, under the Fourth Republic, numerous technological advances were made
which cleared the way for the creation of a French bomb. Indeed, without these gains, France
would not have been able to test its first bomb as quickly as it did. Though de Gaulle touted the
first test, on 13 February 1960, as one of the many successes of the newfound Fifth Republic, it
was in fact Prime Minister Félix Gaillard, in April 1958, who ordered the successful detonation
of a French bomb by early 1960.27
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Despite the continuities between policies, de Gaulle was able to project a sharp departure
from the defunct Fourth Republic through a highly visible and authoritative manner. Whereas the
many leaders of the Fourth Republic relied on negotiation and compromise to alter their position
in NATO, de Gaulle simply announced his decisions, leaving little room for compromise.
Through this use of cult of personality, augmented by an effective manipulation of press
conferences and speeches, de Gaulle was able to create the impression of a renaissance of French
independence under the Fifth Republic.28
Also, despite the limited strategic impact of his decisions on the French Mediterranean
Fleet and foreign nuclear stockpiles, the French President was successful in shaping popular
perception of a strengthened and emboldened France. His announcements – not negotiations – on
the Mediterranean Fleet and the foreign nuclear stockpiles provided the opportunity “to
demonstrate that the Fifth Republic had its own policies.”29 As early as April 1959, already 55%
of the French citizenry believed France had gained international prestige in the year since the de
Gaulle‟s return, compared to only 8% who felt the opposite.30After demonstrating France‟s
seemingly newfound independence in 1959, de Gaulle used the first half of 1960 to reinforce the
presidential image as embodiment of the new French Republic in a series of highly publicized
state visits to the United States and the United Kingdom.
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1960: THE GRAND STATESMAN
Aside from illustrating France‟s seemingly renewed stature through a foreign policy of
non-integration, the French President relied greatly on state visits and summit diplomacy in the
early years of his presidency to substantiate his message of national renewal. Though highly
important, this aspect of de Gaulle‟s foreign policy, his usage of state visits to convey a sense of
grandeur, is rarely mentioned in the historiography. Their conspicuous absence from the
literature on Gaullist diplomacy may stem from the fact that de Gaulle‟s state visits generally did
little to advance negotiations or alter policies regarding NATO.
Perhaps as a result, no study of Gaullist foreign policy has placed his state visits in the
context of his foreign policy of grandeur. This is a predicament not limited to de Gaulle‟s
foreign policy; in general, as Jeffrey G. Giauque noted, “the theoretical literature on summitry, as
opposed to analyses of specific meetings, is quite sparse.”31 Despite their absence from the
secondary literature, the role of summit diplomacy and state visits was central to de Gaulle‟s
foreign policy of grandeur. Indeed, de Gaulle himself attached great importance to state visits.
As he recollected in his memoirs:
The respectful attention shown us on all sides persuaded me to increase our
contacts with the outside world. This led to an active interchange of visits,
all of them occasions for mutual exchanges of view if not always mutual
persuasion, for the furtherance of relations, for the conclusion of agreements
… and for the manifestation of public sentiment. I attached the highest
importance to them, knowing what reverberations such encounters often
produce. True, they no longer have the same dramatic character as of old,
and the facilities of modern travel have deprived them of some of their
glamour. Nevertheless, during these years when France was resuming her
rightful place in the world, the visits to Paris of so many foreign rulers and
31
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statesman, and my own journeys … formed the weft and woof and the
visible illustration of our global recovery.32
He saw state visits as vital, not for the advancement of negotiations, but for their ability to
muster public enthusiasm and shape opinion. The role of state visits offered him a chance to act
as the personification of France abroad.
The French President saw visits of foreign Heads of State and his own travels as grand
opportunities to further French prestige and ensure his own legitimacy. In this effort, one is
reminded of the Third Republic‟s employment of republican symbolism in song, ceremony, and
statuary in its effort to “arouse and orient public opinion,” to quote Philip Nord.33 In a similar
sense, in an age of television and radio, de Gaulle used his monarchical persona and nationalistic
rhetoric in the service of shaping popular perception of the French President and the Fifth
Republic by capturing the attention of newspapers and television stations. With this in mind, de
Gaulle always went to great lengths to ensure the visits were accompanied by magnificent
ceremonies of pomp and circumstance.34 Likewise, his visits to foreign countries almost always
ensured spectacle.
This section therefore focuses on de Gaulle‟s own visits to the United Kingdom and the
United States in April 1960. The visits were significant, as this was de Gaulle‟s only official state
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visit to the US during his presidency and his first official visit to London since his days as leader
of the Free French during the Second World War. Also, and perhaps not unrelated, his string of
visits came on the heels of the detonations of France‟s first and second nuclear bombs, in
February and April respectively, at a time when French prestige, in the eyes of the three other
nuclear-armed states, was at its height.35
The French President‟s first official state visit, a four-day tour de force of ceremonies,
speeches, processions, and banquets, began on 5 April 1960 in the United Kingdom. Shortly after
noon, de Gaulle and his wife arrived by train to London‟s Victoria Station, greeted by a concert
of state officials, including the Queen and Prime Minster, and a sizable assemblage of exuberant
onlookers.36 After cordial exchanges, the official party exited the station and climbed into a
series of open-faced carriages, the first of which was reserved for de Gaulle and the Queen. The
carriages – six in all – led a procession from Victoria Station to Buckingham Palace, the entire
route lined by enthusiastic crowds.37 Upon reaching their destination, the official party found the
Palace surrounded by 100,000 densely-packed Englishmen chanting “Vive de Gaulle.”38 Later
that evening, after a royal banquet honoring the guests, a lavish fireworks display entertained the
French President and the Royal family, perched on a Palace balcony, as well as the “unbroken
sea of upturned faces” still congregating in the surrounding area.39 The crowd of 100,000 persons
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which had gathered around Buckingham Palace and overflowed into St. James Park to witness de
Gaulle‟s entrance was, reportedly, the largest gathering at the Palace since the V - E Day
celebration in May 1945.40
The following day de Gaulle, speaking before both Houses of Parliament, provided an
impassioned and lengthy speech which drew upon the shared memories of the Second World
War, denounced the dangerous and aberrant Cold War, and reaffirmed Anglo-French solidarity.
In typical Gaullist fashion, the entire speech was committed to memory, much to the amazement
of his audience. This feat, accompanied by de Gaulle‟s commanding presence, “combined to
heighten the sense of occasion,” ensuring that none “could be unaware of the surge of emotion
that passed through Westminster Hall and which found expression in sustained handclapping.”41
During the state visit to Britain, de Gaulle capitalized on his legacy as wartime leader of
the Free French to reinforce his claims to presidential legitimacy. Throughout the trip he made
subtle and overt references to his former role. While at Westminster, for instance, he devoted
approximately one-third of his speech to the triumphs and sacrifices of the Second World War.
The following day, de Gaulle was the centerpiece of a gathering of several hundred people held
at Carlton Gardens, de Gaulle‟s wartime headquarters, meant to commemorate the wartime
movement. Additionally, a highlight from the fireworks display of his first evening in London
was a pair of fireworks shaped like the Cross of Lorraine, the Free French symbol. These cues
provided, for all involved, a constant reminder of de Gaulle‟s ostensible authority and stature.
Reinforcing the connection further, de Gaulle spent the majority of the trip donning a spare,
40

Drew Middleton, “De Gaulle gets London Welcome: 100,000 at Palace Acclaim War Leader on His
Return,” New York Times, April 6, 1960.
41
“General De Gaulle Calls to Abandon Nuclear Arms,” The Times, April 8, 1960.

68

khaki military uniform, much more befitting a war hero than the President of the French
Republic. In highlighting his wartime attributes, de Gaulle hoped to establish a degree of
continuity between the perceived heroics of his wartime past and the early Fifth Republic,
thereby disassociating France from the memories of the Fourth Republic. Likewise, these
actions forced the masses to link him to a mythologized and undisputed past, with all its positive
attributes, and not to the negative connotations of a modern politician.
Despite lingering disputes regarding NATO and Britain‟s proposals for a European Free
Trade Area, it was clear from the outset that de Gaulle would use his time in London to conjure
public sentiment, not advance negotiations. Indeed, after a 45 minute tête-à-tête with Harold
Macmillan on the first day of his visit, “there was no indication” that the French President “had
been impressed” with the British Prime Minister‟s proposals.42 The only tangible agreement
scored after two meetings during the trip was a joint reaffirmation of solidarity in the face of the
upcoming East-West summit in May 1960.
His characteristic obstinacy, however, did nothing to prevent his larger goal of shaping
public opinion; indeed the general public responded strongly to the French President. As Life
magazine would describe it, “through an alchemy of personality and sentiment, [de Gaulle] won
a diplomatic triumph without settling one of the many political and economic differences
worrying the two countries.”43 Following his departure, the left-leaning British periodical The
New Statesman reflected on the President‟s visit:
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The warmth of the reception which London has accorded President de
Gaulle is in genuine contrast to the perfunctory cheers which normally
accompany state visits. This is due in part to the general recognition that de
Gaulle, whatever his shortcomings, is a man of quite extraordinary stamp;
for the public, in an age of mediocrities, can still instinctively respond to
greatness. It is also due to the memories, which Londoners still preserve, of
the somber days of 1940 … Today, the British public, though highly critical
of France, recognizes that its old ally has two faces, and is prepared to give
de Gaulle the benefit of the doubt and concede that he represents the one
which we admire and respect.44
The combination of genuine sentiment demonstrated by the masses and de Gaulle‟s selfconscious employment of a paternal and stately public persona helped construct the intended
image of national rejuvenation and resurgence.
Later in the month, de Gaulle made stops in several major cities during his eight-day tour
of the United States. The state visit, lasting longer and stretching thinner than de Gaulle‟s time in
London, lacked the intensity of its predecessor. Nonetheless, de Gaulle did not fail to impress.
He received full city honors when he and Madame de Gaulle arrived in New York City on 26
April, 1960. The couple was treated to an exuberant ticker-tape parade down Broadway en route
to City Hall.45 After his whirlwind 22-hour tour of New York, of which over a million New
Yorkers came out to see, de Gaulle and his official entourage headed west. When he arrived in
San Francisco the following day, he was met by 250,000 people and treated once again to a
ticker-tape and confetti parade, as the procession ambled through tricolor-laden avenues. The
reception “was regarded by the police as the biggest ever given [in San Francisco] to a head of

44
45

“De Gaulle and His Shadow,” The New Statesman, April 9, 1960.
“De Gaulle to Get Full City Honors,” New York Times, April 14, 1960.

70

state.”46 The official trip continued with visits to Washington D.C. and New Orleans, where the
heralded guest received similar treatment before de Gaulle departed for the French Caribbean.
During his visit to Washington, de Gaulle spent ample time privately with President
Eisenhower in the White House and on Eisenhower‟s Gettysburg farm. The two talks between
the men, similar to the de Gaulle-Macmillan talks earlier in the month, reaffirmed their solidarity
in light of the upcoming summit but settled little more beyond it. On a political level, de Gaulle
capably conveyed the image of a restored France under his stewardship. After his departure,
newspapers and periodicals praised the French President for his apparent revival of France as a
stable and reliable ally. Life magazine, for instance, noted that “his reception represented a high
moment of personal and historic triumph,” citing “de Gaulle himself” as the greatest factor for
“the return of French prestige.”47 Newsweek, in a piece on de Gaulle‟s trip, lavished the French
President with even further praise:
As General Charles de Gaulle stepped from his plane into the brilliant
sunshine … one could sense the feeling of pride in the man … In 22
months, by sheer force of his character, he completely had recast the
world‟s image of France. No longer did the world look upon France as a
third-rate power, incapable of governing itself and more a problem for the
West than a viable asset. Now France again indubitably was a great power.
De Gaulle had come to Washington, at the oft-repeated invitation of
President Eisenhower, as a full-fledged partner of the U.S. and Britain in
planning the West‟s position for the summit conference.48
By all accounts, it seems, de Gaulle had effectively woven for his hosts a new image of the
French Republic based on his perceived steadfast leadership.
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But how did the French regard their president‟s state visits abroad? They followed his
every step closely from France. Each day, from 5 April to 10 April, Le Figaro made his state
visit to Britain the headline story, which suggests a genuine preoccupation. The accompanying
pictures alone were revealing. The photos evoked grandeur and pride, the President always, and
without fail, depicted as stately and regal. On 5 April 1960, for instance, the front page photo
depicted the Tricolor waving majestically alongside the Union Jack with the clock tower of the
British Parliament providing the backdrop.49 Several pages later, a picture depicted a small boy,
alongside a policeman, gazing in awe as mounted guards prepared for their guest‟s arrival.50
Both images conveyed simple messages of reverence and admiration. In the following days, the
pictures of de Gaulle showed him in commanding poses, from saluting a crowd,51 to speaking
before parliament and inspecting royal guards.52 All conveyed, day after day, a sense of authority
and monarchical statesmanship. Photography does, admittedly, play an abstract role in shaping
public perception. There is no doubt, however, that the steady barrage for nearly a week, which
depicted French grandeur personified in the President, helped reinforce messages of renewed
national unity and prestige.
The words were no less flattering. Le Monde wrote on the day of de Gaulle‟s London
arrival, “President de Gaulle … is assured in advance of a most enthusiastic welcome. Even
among those, notably the Labour Party and the Liberals, who the politics of grandeur irritates, it
is held in high esteem. It inspires respect.”53 Le Monde also made a special point to include

49

“Le Général de Gaulle gagnera en carrosse le palais de Buckingham,” Le Figaro, 5 Avril 1960.
“Le Général de Gaulle aujourd‟hui à Londres,” Le Figaro, 5 Avril 1960.
51
Le Figaro, 6 Avril 1960.
52
Le Figaro, 8 Avril 1960.
53
Henri Pierre, “D‟abord l‟homme du 18 Juin,” Le Monde, 5 Avril 1960.
50

72

doting reviews from the British press, including the Daily Mirror and the Guardian.54 All of
these measures helped portray de Gaulle as a man of exceptional qualities. Both the foreign
press, of which was translated into French in the leading newspapers, and the papers‟ own
reporters offered lavish praise.
Ultimately, the foreign policy initiatives taken by the administration in the early years of
the Fifth Republic effectively shaped the perception of national renewal. It is a testament to de
Gaulle‟s theatrics that the limits of French power were largely concealed during the period. From
a strategic standpoint, de Gaulle‟s challenges had virtually no impact on the functionality of the
alliance. Consider the French Mediterranean Fleet for instance: only about one-third of France‟s
naval tonnage in the Mediterranean actually was integrated into NATO. The other two-thirds
had always remained under national command, since NATO‟s inception, and was never
integrated.55 The move was, in reality, completely ineffectual. Yet de Gaulle‟s NATO allies, like
Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak, still fretted the “incalculable psychological significance.”56
The nature of Gaullist foreign policy during the period ensured broad popular support, as
he did not affront his NATO allies but instead simply resisted integration. Moreover, de Gaulle
was always quick to affirm France‟s fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance (the concert of Western
nations), even if he rejected the integrationist model of NATO. In all, his decisions were
generally supported by the French public, who maintained skepticism about the usefulness of
NATO, let alone France‟s meager position in it. The manner in which he approached state visits
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also contributed to a heightened perception of renewal and change in the young Gaullist Fifth
Republic.
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CONCLUSION
The period from spring 1958 to spring 1960 marked the return of Gaullism as a potent
political force. During that time the French Republic saw the end of the Fourth Republic, barely
twelve years old, and the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, one which provided the president
with unprecedented powers. The main goal of de Gaulle, Michel Debré, and others, of course,
was the creation of a state which allowed for one paternal figure to rise above the divisive
elements of modern politics and promote a particular vision of national unity. This came in the
form of Charles de Gaulle, who, supported by his Gaullist companions, shaped a narrative of
renewal and unity in the early Fifth Republic.
Employing nationalism, through rhetoric and a tangible policies (including foreign
policy), the Gaullists sought to legitimate the Fifth Republic and its “Republican Monarch.” The
legitimacy they craved came in the form of popular support, or at least muted dissention. The
Gaullists sought to vindicate their constitutional reforms by crafting a persuasive argument that
the Fifth Republic had rectified France‟s course (both domestically and internationally) after the
perceived failures of prior republics. In this effort, the Gaullists consistently vilified the
parliamentary nature of the Fourth Republic, arguing that the system institutionalized the
divisions within French society. In contrast, the Gaullists hoped to portray the “Republican
Monarch,” in further evidence of fundamental change between republics, as the embodiment of
French unity.
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To serve this end, de Gaulle and company orchestrated a foreign policy that lent the
perception of positive change and also presidential authority. By carrying out diplomatic
initiatives that had popular appeal and responded to widespread French social and political
anxieties, de Gaulle managed to substantiate his claims of national unity and legitimacy. The
copious press coverage that accompanied all of de Gaulle‟s actions, alongside his resolute and
stately persona, made the decisions seem very potent. His decisions were generally supported by
the French public, who maintained skepticism about the usefulness of NATO, let alone France‟s
meager position in it. The manner in which he approached state visits also contributed to a
heightened perception of renewal and change in the young Gaullist Fifth Republic. The way de
Gaulle framed the policy decisions – that France deserved independence and prestige, if not
influence – proved difficult for leftist opponents to craft compelling counterarguments, at least in
the early years.
A GAULLIST SUCCESS?
How, then, do we measure if the Gaullists‟ efforts succeeded? Certainly, I have already
identified how each of the relevant foreign policy decisions received some degree of popular
support from the French public. But this only reveals one aspect of the larger goal. As I stated
throughout, the broader goal of the Gaullists was to effectively convince the French public that
the early Fifth Republic served to rejuvenate France and unify the French people under the
leadership of Charles de Gaulle. In this effort, foreign policy provided one aspect. The real
measurement of Gaullist success was the extent to which the public bought into the narrative of
renewal and unity.
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In this respect, the Gaullists did prove successful. Their first goal was to mythologize the
person of General de Gaulle and, from there, make him synonymous with the Fifth Republic.
The national myth of Charles de Gaulle became a central piece of the constitutional revisions,
which aimed to institutionalize what Stanley Hoffman has termed “heroic leadership,”1
envisioned by Debré and others. As Debré wrote later:
Most certainly, this constitution, in the minds of those who conceived and
wrote it, and I myself was foremost among them, did allow General de
Gaulle to assume responsibility for French affairs for the longest period of
years possible. How could we have considered doing otherwise when in
every respect our domestic state of affairs, the needs of Europe, and the
exigencies of the world scene called for a kind of government that only
General de Gaulle, even though he was entering his later years, could lead
and ensure?2
De Gaulle provided for the Gaullists the galvanizing force with which to represent the perception
of profound governmental change following the inauguration of the Fifth Republic.
For the Gaullists, Charles de Gaulle represented the Man of 18 June – the mythologized
(and romanticized) lone resister in June 1940 and the undisputable personification of the French
nation thereafter. This myth was constructed and shaped largely by the writings of the Gaullist
intellectual Raymond Aron in the 1950s and accepted by a French public unwilling to turn a
critical, introspective eye onto the wartime years under the Vichy regime.3 De Gaulle, too,
mythologized his own role in his massively popular Memoires de Guerre, published in the midto-late 1950s. Conveniently, and perhaps not coincidentally, the final volume of de Gaulle‟s war
1
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memoirs was released in 1959 under the title Le Salut (Salvation). Fittingly, the last volume
recounted de Gaulle‟s triumphs in saving France and restoring the French state following Nazi
occupation (seen, of course, through a fuzzy and nostalgic lens).4 The theme of salvation proved
timely during the first year of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle‟s presidency.
Additionally, in Gaullist lore, de Gaulle‟s ostensibly apolitical role, for them, meant that
he could embody the nation in its entirety (unlike the supposedly partisan politicians emblematic
of prior French republicanism). André Malraux, the writer and Minister of Culture under de
Gaulle, revealed this thought in 1969 in a conversation with de Gaulle: “For the majority those
who followed you, it does not seem to me that your ideology was the major element. The
important thing was something else: during the war, obviously, it was the national will;
afterward, and especially since 1958, it was the feeling that your motives, good or bad, were not
the motives of the politicians.”5 The early Fifth Republic, then, rested on the legacy of de Gaulle.
The Gaullists made him the central representation of the perceived shift from the Fourth
Republic to the Fifth.
In this multi-faceted myth-making of de Gaulle, the public responded positively. His
perceived aura of national legitimacy did much to ensure confidence and support for the regime.
As one Frenchwomen wrote in November 1958, “Most of us are hopeful but worried. Maybe
that‟s what we are worried about – being hopeful, I mean. Here in France we‟ve lost the habit for
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so long.”6 Fittingly, the women‟s thoughts echoed both aspects of the Gaullist narrative: that de
Gaulle had revived France and that the Fourth Republic (and earlier) had consistently failed the
French people. Additionally, de Gaulle‟s constant denunciations of a Fourth Republic “totally
unfit to ensure the conduct of affairs” helped shape public perception.7 In August 1958, for
instance, 75% of the French public agreed that “the parliamentary system was bad.”8 In contrast,
60% of the public expressed satisfaction in de Gaulle‟s government. Their greatest reasons for
support were his ability to reestablish “hope and confidence,” “return order,” and “give strength
as leader.”9
Electoral success for Gaullist and other conservative parties sympathetic to the Gaullist
cause in 1958, and later in 1962, helped sustain the perception of change under de Gaulle‟s
leadership. In the elections of 1958, for instance, the Gaullists gained 216 of 481 seats in
parliament. Together, with other right-leaning parties, the conservatives parties gained 388 of
481 possible parliamentary seats.10 The overwhelming successes of conservative and Gaullist
parties in parliament helped authenticate de Gaulle‟s claims to national unity.
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We shouldn‟t forget, however, that the Gaullists had their opponents during the period. In
the vote for de Gaulle‟s investiture on 1 June 1958, for instance, 244 deputies voted “no,” many
of whom came from the socialist or communist ranks and proved skeptical to cede power to a
strong man in a manner all too reminiscent of the investiture of Marshal Pétain in 1940.11
Throughout the de Gaulle presidency, there were leftists and, increasingly, figures on the farright who denounced de Gaulle and his allies. Thanks to Gaullist efforts to include leaders of the
major parties in the constitutional drafting process, many parties found themselves forced to
reluctantly accede to the Gaullist Fifth Republic. On the far-right, meanwhile, partisans became
disillusioned with de Gaulle‟s position on French Algeria. But their voices were capably
marginalized. In numerous instances the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), in efforts to
preserve French Algeria, organized uprisings and assassination attempts against the de Gaulle
government – acts not dissimilar from the one that toppled the Fourth Republic in May 1958.12
De Gaulle countered by denouncing the “guilty ones” and reiterating his mandate granted by the
French people and the “national legitimacy” he had “embodied for twenty years.”13 The de
Gaulle government proved able to silence or marginalize, in the early years, the rancorous
factions that challenged its narrative of national unity.
In all, the diplomatic decisions chosen for study in this thesis presented just one of many
elements which contributed to the Gaullist narrative of change and renewal. In this respect, the
foreign policy cases helped shape public perception but were not, of course, the central factor.
11
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One should not overlook the main element which ensured public support for the regime in this
early period. The public had invested in Charles de Gaulle to solve the seemingly unsolvable
quagmire in Algeria. Everything else, including international affairs, was ancillary to this
pressing concern. The public proved willing to go along with the prescribed governmental
changes mainly because of the mandate they had given de Gaulle in regards to the Algerian War.
As the war ran its course, though, the Gaullists relied on various policies to sustain the
feeling of hope and confidence which pervaded during the period of de Gaulle‟s investiture. De
Gaulle attached the greatest importance to this effort: “The important thing – perhaps the most
important thing for all men who have been involved with history – was not what I said, but the
hope I roused. So far as the world goes, if I have renewed France, it is because I renewed hope in
France.”14
Public support, though not during the early period covered in this thesis, did eventually
wane. Though beyond the scope of this thesis, the events of May 1968 represent the most
obvious example of the eventual repudiation of de Gaulle and the Gaullist narrative he
maintained. In foreign policy too, as de Gaulle took on an increasingly confrontational stance in
the later years of the administration – most notably in the outright withdrawal from integrated
command in 1966 from NATO – public support wavered.15 Even during the period studied here,
the notions of national unity the Gaullists evoked were, in many ways, illusions. The consistent
electoral majorities and the public‟s trust in de Gaulle to end the Algerian War aided the
Gaullists in their efforts to paper over the divisions in French society that did still exist. Though
14
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University of California Press, 1993), 142-43.
15
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the Gaullists, in their goals outlined in this thesis, proved successful till 1960, a larger study
would seek to recognize the longer-term limits of their efforts.
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